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The Origins of Soviet-Egypt Special Relations, 1971-1974

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This article is set to investigate the special relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt in early Sadat administration, 1971-1974. The Soviet-Egypt special relations were based on three factors—international system, states, and decision-makers. From the perspective of international system, since U.S. and Israel were the *status quo* powers, and the Soviet Union and Egypt were the revisionist countries that aimed to challenge such an unfavorable power structure, Moscow and Cairo were forced to form a coalition; from the national level, the pursuit of common security instead of economic interests became the important factor of promoting Soviet-Egypt special relations; from the decision-making level, the Soviet leaders viewed Egypt as the bridgehead to expand her interests in the Middle East. Likewise, Sadat acknowledged that the Soviet Union was the main source of obtaining advanced weapons on the one hand, but meanwhile was concerned that the Soviet Union could manipulate Egyptian leadership and may interfere in the internal affairs of Sadat administration. In fact, the two governments' elites established asymmetrical special relations based on expediency and convenience, and hence such special relations were doom to fall apart with the shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State in late 1973.

Keywords: Soviet-Egypt relations, quasi-alliance, special relations, Middle East Cold War

Introduction

During the Cold War, alliance and partnership were the two main pillars of Soviet foreign security strategies, which were the most important means for Moscow to use the third world countries' strategic resources from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean, and from Africa to Southeast Asia. In 1970s, to consolidate its special relations with target countries, the Soviet Union signed treaty of friendship and cooperation with the third world countries, such as India and Egypt respectively in 1971, with Iraq in 1972, and with Vietnam in 1978. It's worth nothing that India dismembered Pakistan at the end of 1971 after the signing of Soviet-Indian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation; Egypt launched air attack against Israel in 1973 after the concluding of Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation; Vietnam invaded Cambodia soon after it entered into the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow in 1978. The establishment of special relations seemingly prompted Soviet allies to choose war. What were the dynamics for the Soviet Union to build special relations with the third world countries? How was the efficacy? Why were the special relations terminated? This article is set to take the case of Soviet-Egypt special relations in the early Sadat administration as an example to disclose the myth.

At present, the declassified historical archives about the relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt in 1970s are not available, but some public documents and memoirs have been published, such as *From Encroachment to Involvement: A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1973*, written by Yaaccov Ro'I; *The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War*, written by Kohler, Gouré, and Harvey (1974) from Miami University argues that Soviet Middle East policy was formulated under the background of US-Soviet constructing global "anti-empire united front" and the Soviet Union explored both peaceful coexist with U.S. and expanding its influence in the third world countries. In addition, the *Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis*, written by Golan (1977), Hebrew University, Israel, also contends that the signing of *Soviet-Egypt Treaty of Amity and Cooperation* in 1971 enhanced Egyptian determination to recover its lost ground. It showed Soviet partiality for Arab countries for the Soviet statement about Egypt-Israeli conflict of October 7, 1973 and Soviet warning to Israel of October 23, which seemingly indicated that the Soviet Middle East policy caused the outbreak of the Fourth Middle East War. In 1990, Golan finished his another book—*Soviet Policies in the Middle East*, in which he introduces Soviet and Syrian summit diplomacy after the outbreak of the Fourth Middle East War and stresses that Soviet military assistance to Arab countries was the main tool of penetrating into the Arab world.

British political researcher Dawisha (1979) stresses the numerous factors of Soviet foreign policy to Egypt from the perspective of the relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt and its historic development. He stresses that from the macro level, Soviet military strength, population, the size of its economy, ideology and external environment could affect Soviet foreign policy to Egypt, while from the micro level, its foreign policy to Egypt was influenced by Soviet political system, interest groups and elites, whose foreign policy tools include diplomacy, economic assistance, trade, military, propaganda, culture, etc.

American scholars also achieved some important fruit in this field. For example, U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay J. D. Glassman during George W. Bush administration had explored in depth Soviet-Egyptian relations. In his book—*Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East*, Glassman thought that, since the outbreak of the Second Middle East War in 1956, the Soviet Union had provided all kinds of defensive and offensive weapons to Arab countries and even if the Soviet Union had not publicly supported Egypt and Syria to use force settling the conflict with Israel, the weapons that Soviet supplied made the outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostility possible, including the Suez War in 1956, the Six Day War in 1967, the war of attrition in 1968, and the Fourth Middle East War in 1973. Glassman (1975) adopts a historical approach and refers to news media and government work report.

Professor R. O. Freedman (1975) of Baltimore Hebrew University attempted in his book *Soviet Policy Towards the Middle East* to divide Soviet-Egyptian relations into three stages: the first stage was from the death of President Nasser in 1970 to Egyptian expelling of Soviet military experts in1972; the second stage was from Egyptian banishment of Soviet military experts to the outbreak of Ramadan War of October 6, 1973; the third stage was from October 6, 1973 to the end of October 1973. The author cited a good many of remarks of government officials, as well as reports by newspapers and magazines.

In his book, *Red Star on the Nile*, Rubinstein (1977), derived from a large number of historical materials, studied the huge challenges that Soviet-Egyptian relations faced in the Fourth Middle East War and highlighted the key role of leadership personality traits in maintaining the relations of inter-states. Even if this book was the classics of studying Soviet-Egyptian relations, it was inevitable to avoid bias as the literature was mostly from the West. Another American scholar Garthoff (1985) who is an expert in researching the history of the Cold

War and particularly the Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War, in his book, *Détente and Confrontation*, from the perspective of US-Soviet detente, concluded that there had always been contradiction between détente (seeking cooperation with America) and confrontation (confronting with America in Arab-Israeli conflict) for Soviet leader Brezhnev. On the one hand, Soviet hoped to relax the relations with America to gain most-favored-nation status, solving internal economic issues; on the other hand, it was hard to turn a deaf ear to the demand of Egypt and Syria's arms-buying and Arab-Israeli conflict. In fact, the outbreak of the Fourth Middle East War portended the collapse of Soviet defense policy.

In terms of Soviet-Egyptian relations during Sadat administration, Egyptian officials and scholars also made some researches. As an illustration, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Heikal (1978), On the grounds of his own collected documents and memoirs, and Egyptian officials' testimony and other public documents, wrote a book titled *Sphinx and Commissar: the Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World.* The book revealed some important historic pictures and details and highlighted that the Fourth Middle East War was the turning point of Soviet influence from prosperity to decline in Arab world, especially in Egypt. However, as the author admits in the preface that this book has less to do with academic study to the history of international relations than politician's recollection of its own personal experiences.

Even if there are plenty of researches on Soviet-Egyptian relations during Sadat administration, few are from the perspective of special relations. This passage touches down upon Soviet-Egypt special relations in this era as a case study, on the strength of recently declassified archives, memoirs, and the second-hand materials.

The Formation of Soviet-Egyptian Special Relations

In 1970, President Nasser, a Pan-Arab nationalist leader, died of heart attack, and Deputy President Sadat succeeded to the Egyptian president. Compared with Nasser's high prestige in Egypt and the Arab world, Sadat was unknown. In his early administration, Sadat regime was instable and the Soviet Union kept doubts about his direction of Egyptian foreign policy, so the new President had to take a low-profile policy.

With the new regime gradually strengthened, Sadat started to abandon his consistent low-key approach and put forward his own "Policy blueprint". Different from Nasser that firmly advocated defensive strategy after the third Middle East War of 1967, Sadat proposed to execute an offensive strategy—crossing the Suez Canal, defeating Israeli troops and recovering Sinai Peninsula. With regards to this, Sadat posed that "at the expense of one million Egyptians". There were running parallel between Egyptian territorial demands of Sinai Peninsula and Soviet objective of gaining strategic fortress in the Mediterranean and the two countries were complementary to each other. As Albanian relations with China heated up while Albanian-Soviet relations gradually deteriorated, the Soviet Union lost its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Sadat was willing to provide naval port, air base to the Soviet Union and agreed to set up the latter's electronic stations, which made the Soviet Union possible to pay close attention to the trends of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, since the Sixth Fleet was equipped with nuclear weapons and might attack Soviet in case of emergency. To win Egyptian trust, the Soviet promised to supply quality weaponry to Egypt. By 1970, the number of Soviet military experts and consultants to Egypt soared from 2,500-5,000 of 1960s to 10,000 (Mott IV, 2001). While the amount of Soviet military experts and consultants in Egypt increased, Egyptian dependence on Soviet military technology and equipment had also increased. With the gradual expansion of Soviet military and political influence in Egypt, the two countries developed special relations.

To make better use of the "quasi-ally" of the Soviet Union, Sadat made up his mind to recover the lost ground occupied by Israel in 1967. In January 1971, Sadat initiated the scheme for the battle of crossing Suez Canal and recovering Sinai Peninsula. In February, the new types of Egyptian missiles were shipped to the Suez Canal and started the plan of withdrawing civilians from the Suez Canal battleground. However, to launch air strike against Israel, Egypt need advanced offensive weapons. So in two and a half years, the core agenda of Soviet-Egypt special relations was arms sales. On January 15, 1971, Nikolai Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union led strong lineup trade delegation to visit Egypt, nominally celebrating the completion of the Aswan Dam, but actually inspecting the operation of the new government of Egypt under Sadat and evaluating the necessity of Soviet arms sales to Egypt. Sadat pointed out in a speech that "the late President Nasser was a symbol of our national spirit, and Aswan Dam is the symbol of our national strength. Today our most intimate friends are celebrating the successful completion of the Dam together. And the Soviet Union and great Soviet people have provided great help to Egypt" (Israeli, 1978). Chairman Nikolai Podgorny emphasized that only people chose correct roads, kept vigilant against the enemy and sought truly reliable friends and allies, could imperialism and its followers be eliminated (Glassman, 1975). Even if Sadat was dubious of the Soviet hidden motives of controlling the new government, after all, Egypt had not yet finished the reunification of motherland, and the Soviet Union was the only reliable and even the primary supporter of Egypt. Soviet-Egypt complementary in military and political goals pushed the two sides to shelve their differences and gradually drew together in strategy.

In the first three months of 1971, Soviet arms sales turnover to Egypt increased substantially, whose air defense system covered the whole Egyptian territory. But Sadat clearly knew that there was still a large gap for Egypt's military compared with that of Israel. On May 1, 1971, Sadat visited the Soviet Union secretly and demanded Moscow to meet the following three requirements: (1) Have military and political arrangement between two states; (2) The Soviet Union provides Egypt with as many weapons as Israel has got; (3) The Soviet will sell weapons to Egypt regularly in the future. Sadat was satisfied with the Soviet defensive weapons but demanded that Moscow offer a large number of offensive weapons too. But the Soviet leader set a principle that Egyptian government cannot use the Soviet aircraft without its permission (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002). The condition that the Soviet Union proposed chained the Sadat administration and invisibly made Cairo a puppet of the Soviet Union, which was unacceptable to Sadat. He pointed out that if Israel once again launched a large-scale attack against Egypt, should Egypt launch a retaliatory attack only after Soviet permission? "It would put me into an awkward position. I am the head of state and will not abandon the freedom of unilateral action" (Heikal, 1975). Finally, Sadat wished to keep distance with the Soviet and then could create opportunity for improving relations with America. For the newly appointed Sadat, establishing partnership with U.S. or the Soviet Union was a strategic option and Egypt would not stick to any power forever, highlighting the flexibility of Sadat foreign strategy.

Since Sadat was elected president of Egypt with 90 percent of approval and it was not easy for the Soviet Union to control it. In March 1971, the Soviet delegation led by Chairman Nikolai Podgorny visited Egypt again and left on May 8. During this visit, Sadat claimed to have foiled an attempted coup and actually purged the Soviet proxies placed inside Egyptian government—Vice President Ali Sabri and Minister of War Mohammed Fawzi.

After Egyptian government crushed the failed coup, there had been media reports that the Soviet Union was behind the plot to overthrow Sadat regime, so that Soviet-Egyptian relations was subject to certain negative

influence and Soviet leader's distrust of Sadat was further enhanced. Sadat even shook "olive branch" to America in this chance and wished that America could help Egypt to recover the lost ground, while at this time Nixon administration was busy with visiting China and proposed that Egypt-Israel should recognize each other's existence, but the improvement of U.S.-Egypt relation was not included in Nixon's policy agenda, which compelled Sadat to pin his hopes of recovering Sinai Peninsula on improving Soviet-Egypt relations.

After being ignored by Nixon administration, Sadat was more rational to the relation with the Soviet Union. He knew that it was hard to confront with Israel without the help of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was the only dependable super power. To remove Soviet leader's suspicion to him, Sadat took initiative to improve Soviet-Egyptian relations, inviting Chairman Podgorny to revisit Cairo on May 25, 1971 and holding talks on promoting Soviet-Egyptian relations. After negotiations, the two sides finally reached consensus and signed *Soviet-Egypt Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation* valid for 15 years (Ovendale, 2004). According to this agreement, Egyptian leaders promised to consult with the Soviet Union in advance before taking any significant measures; the Soviet responded to provide advanced weapons to Egypt, including MiG-23 and Scud missiles, all of which could hit the heart land of Israel and which were superior to the *Phantom* fighters in performance (Breslauer, 1990). What Sadat expected was that the Soviet Union could treat Egypt as equal partner on the one hand, and reduce Moscow's suspicions to Sadat administration on the other, especially after Vice President Sabri, a pro-Soviet figure was compelled to resign; it was more necessary for Sadat to show his position of anti-Americanism, which was the foundation for the Soviet to extend a large number of military assistance. The sign of *Soviet-Egypt Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation* marked the formal establishment of Soviet-Egypt special relations.

Soviet-Egypt special relation is a complete expediency to them, which planted the seeds for the deterioration of the bilateral relations in the future. In July 1971, as to Sudanese civil war, the contradiction between the Soviet Union and Egypt appeared again—both Egypt and Libya supported Sudanese government to suppress the rebels and maintain the regime stability while the Soviet Union accused Egypt of helping Sudan to suppress progressive forces. When the Soviet Union exerted pressure on Egyptian government, Sadat reiterated that Egypt would not succumb to the outside power's pressure (Mott IV, 2001). As can be seen from Sudanese incident, both Egypt and Libya opposed "Communism in Africa" and viewed it as a curse. For Sadat, both internal and external threat can affect the stability of his own regime, while the former was even more destructive.

The Consolidation of Soviet-Egyptian Special Relations

Soviet-Egypt special relations were mainly manifested between inter-governmental exchanges. On October 11, 1971, Sadat visited Moscow and held talks with three Soviet giants—General Secretary Brezhnev, Chairman of the Council Ministers Kosygin and Chairman Podgorny respectively, which aimed at eliminating the impact of Egyptian government's arrest of Sabri on Soviet-Egyptian relations. He expressed his gratitude to strong Soviet support to Egypt's national liberation cause and social progress and meanwhile demanded that the Soviet Union sell advanced weapons at the end of November 1971, so that 1971 could become the "year of decision"—to recover the Sinai Peninsula, illegally occupied by Israel, because Egypt was forced to take a significant measure. However, despite of promising to strengthen the defense capabilities of Egypt and other Arab countries, the Soviet Union did not support Egypt wholeheartedly to launch a war against Israel and even argued that it was unrealistic to settle Arab-Israeli conflict by military means because Arab countries were bound to be defeated (Breslauer, 1990).

In addition, to eliminate the negative impact of Egyptian government's supporting Sudanese government on Soviet-Egyptian relations, Sadat had to change his gesture and condemned the "anti-communist movement" in Arab world and stressed that this was discrimination against the mass who called for progress and emancipation. In return, Soviet expressed support to Sadat new government and hoped that Egypt, Syria, and Libya could also become the progressive forces (Laqueur, 1974). After returning home, Sadat embarked on the military struggle of recovering Sinai Peninsula. On November 21, 1971, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat delivered a speech at an advanced air base and stressed that: "The USA is pursuing an ambiguous policy. We have lost all hopes for a peaceful solution and have no alternative but to fight in order to recover our land and regain our honor". However, on December 8, 1971, since India and Pakistan broke out an inter-state war, the Soviet had to put the main focus onto South Asia and even unilaterally withdrew experts who served to protect Egyptian Aswan Dam, aircraft and air defense equipments. It was very obvious that the Soviet did not hope that Egypt stirred up a crisis in the Middle East again before India-Pakistan conflict ended. Without Soviet support, Egypt's "year of decision" turned out to be a "year of inaction". Even if the Soviet Union had put forward to provide MiG-23, Tu-22 fighters and surface-to-surface Scud missiles to Egypt for several times, it had not been enacted, because the Soviet Union worried that once Egypt got these weapons, there was possibility for Egypt to launch a total war with Israel, while at this moment the Soviet Union reckoned that the primary target was to avoid the escalation of US-Soviet conflict and consolidate crisis management (Breslauer, 1990).

Soon afterwards, through the Soviet Ambassador in Egypt Vladimir Vinogradov, Sadat requested to visit Moscow again in January 1972 but was required to postpone the date of visit to February 1972, indicating that Moscow disagreed with Egypt's plan of attacking Israel. Egyptian government learned that Nixon administration sold $6 million worth of weaponry, which far exceeded the amount of assistance during Johnson administration to Israel in the year of 1971 (*Insight Team of the Sunday Times*, 1974, p. 54). On February 1972, USA also announced to sell 42 F-4 fighters and 92 A-4 fighters, chalking a new record of U.S. arms sales to Israel. U.S. military assistance to Israel added Egyptian dissatisfaction of the Soviet Union, which became the main reason why Sadat demanded that the Soviet Union provide more military assistance during his visit to The Soviet Union.

Sadat's revisit of Moscow started on February 2, 1972, who was given a grand reception by General Secretary Brezhnev. Both sides emphasized that the talk was a "great success", portending that the relations have entered an important turning point and the friendship would endure forever (Walter Laqueur, 1974, p. 13). Leaving aside these diplomatic discourses, Sadat's second visit to Moscow was actually a failure and he went home with empty hands, thereupon the contradiction between the Soviet Union and Egypt started to gradually surface. For instance, Soviet leader stressed that Egypt should stick to the UN Security Council Resolution 242 of settling dispute by peaceful means. For the demands of arms buying, General Secretary Brezhnev even sneered that if every Egyptian tanks were able to shoot a shell in 1967, the situation would have been totally different, but Egyptian weaponry was simply not used at all (*Insight Team of the Sunday Times*, 1974, p. 55). As can be seen from the complaint of General Sectary Brezhnev, the Soviet Union thought the crux of the matter was not the lack of weapons but the incapacity for using the existing weapons; this was Soviet leader's "reason" of rejecting Egyptian arms purchase.

Failed to obtain the advanced Soviet weapons, Sadat suffered from the consistent criticism from domestic political circles, especially the "year of decision" in 1971, turned out to be a "year of inaction", challenging the legitimacy of Sadat's domestic rule. In April 1972, Sadat started his third visit to Moscow and stressed that

Egypt had no choice but to recover the lost land by way of war. In a Joint Communiqué issued on April 29, the Soviet Union and Egypt consistently thought Israel had been pursuing a hostile policy and America was not interested in solving Arab-Israeli conflict by political approach, hence it was necessary for Egypt to use other means to recover the land illegally occupied by Israel (Alvin Rubinstein, 1977). The "other means" implied that it was possible for Egypt to use military force to recover land. This was the first time for the Soviet government to recognized that Egypt had right to recover the occupied land by non-peaceful means, which was a turning point.

After the end of "Six-Day war", with the excuse of protecting Egypt, the Soviet Union constantly sent military personnel to Egypt; in the early stage of Sadat administration, there were a total of 5,000 military advisers, 10,000 to 15,000 other military personnel, establishing 50 Sam-2 and Sam-3 missile defense bases and 200 MiG-21J fighters with pilots of The Soviet Union. On July 13, 1972, the Soviet government provided an analysis report for Egypt and thought that U.S. stand on the Middle East did not change at all, because Egypt and other Arab countries were like motionless corpses while the USA would only follow the logic of "might is right" (*Insight Team of the Sunday Times*, 1974, p. 56). This move mainly attempted to provoke U.S.-Egypt relations, however, it played a stimulating role for Sadat's offensive plan objectively. Sadat deemed that only through preemptive war, could Egypt break dead lock of "neither war nor peace" and challenge the legitimacy of Israeli occupation of Sinai Peninsula as well as recover the dignity and honor of the Arab world.

On June 1972, President Sadat sent a letter to General Secretary Brezhnev, interrogating if the Soviet Union was willing to provide offensive weapons. Considering upcoming U.S.-Soviet "honeymoon", the Soviet Union did not respond publicly. In order to reduce the criticism and accusations from domestic forces, Sadat decided to send Prime Minister Aziz Sidki to the Soviet Union on July 13 but still in vain. It made Sadat extremely annoyed that the Soviet government refused to provide MiG-2 fighters, and was opposed to Egyptian war against Israel with a view to maintain Middle East status quo. Hence, on July 18, 1972, Egyptian central committee made a decision—expelling Soviet military advisers and experts. Despite expressing gratitude for the help of the Soviet military experts, Egypt demanded that Soviet weaponry should either be sold to Egypt or must be withdrawn to the Soviet Union. According to *Soviet-Egypt Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation*, Egypt appealed that both countries should hold advanced bilateral consultations. President Sadat explained the reason of Egyptian banishment of Soviet military advisers and experts:

> I had told Soviet leaders, there were three things with which I couldn't agree to: first, unless eliminating the threat of Israeli aggression, we won't agree with the Soviet's limited arms sales to Egypt, otherwise Israeli weaponry would always be superior; second, we couldn't accept the situation of "neither war nor peace"; and third，Egypt would dig in its heels on the territorial issue. (Maghroori & Gorman, 1981, pp. 6-7)

Hereafter, the Soviet withdrew a good many of Soviet military advisers and experts from Egypt, only 700-900 left. Sadat attempted to pressure the Soviet Union and pushed her to value Soviet-Egyptian for one thing, and for another tried to shake olive branch to the USA, and neutralize the USA after the outbreak of Arab-Israeli conflict. Sadat announced to expel the Soviet experts, which made Soviet-Egypt special relations suffer from huge setbacks. To avoid over dependence on Egypt and meanwhile to expand its influence in the Middle East, the Soviet Union began to provide a large number of weaponry to Syria and supplied assistance to South Yemen, Morocco and Algeria, as well as signing *Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation* with Iraq in April 1972 (Ro'I, 1974). General Secretary Brezhnev and President Sadat conducted ending both countries

special relations as bet, deteriorating the bilateral relationship and even recalling the ambassadors stationed in each other as well as forcing counterpart to make compromise, but Sadat wasn't touch the red line—terminating the diplomatic relations with Soviet, because Egypt was not willing to sacrifice the relationship with The Soviet Union when improving the relations with USA. The later six months of 1972 was the time when Soviet and Egypt relation was gradually restored, for instance, by the end of July 1972, Soviet military advisers and experts came back to Egypt and reached more than 20,000 (O'Balance, 1978).

After Egypt expelled Soviet military advisers and experts, Syrian President Assad began to play the role of mediator. On October 16, 1972, President Assad visited Moscow and hoped that the Soviet Union and Egypt were able to reestablish strategic partnership. Soon afterwards, Egyptian Prime Minister Aziz Sedki revisited Moscow and swore to Brezhnev that Egypt would never betray the Soviet Union and would never surrender to the USA; Egypt had always been the strategic partner of the Soviet Union, but in exchange, Egypt hoped that the Soviet Union could be able to provide advanced MiG-23 fighters. To fawn the Soviet Union, Sadat replaced the Minister of War Sadik who was not favored by the Soviet Union to Ahmed Ismail Ali. To restore congenial relationship, the Soviet Union also announced to support Arab countries to recover occupied land by any necessary means (Golan, 1977). Soviet-Egypt special relations were active again after more than three months of crisis.

There were some associations between the restore of Soviet-Egypt special relations and the stagnation of U.S.-Egypt relation. Even if Sadat actively made a nod to USA, Nixon administration was disinterested in improving Egypt-Israeli relations and even announced to sell "Phantom" fighters to Tel Aviv on January 1, 1973. A week later, U.S. government declared the new military cooperation agreement with Israel, according to which America would help Israel to achieve military modernization and provide new vessels to Israeli navy (*Insight Team of the Sunday Times*, 1974, p. 210), which disappointed Sadat. The harsh reality was placed in front of the Egyptian government—its good willing could not exchange for U.S. balanced position on Arab-Israeli issue, so Sadat had to retreat to the old track of Soviet-Egypt special relations.

In order to restore Soviet-Egyptian relationship, both countries were active. In 1973, bilateral cooperation in the field of arms sales was even higher than that of 1972. President Sadat said with gratitude in January 1973 that the Soviet Union now provided a surprising number of weapons to Egypt now (Kimche, 1991). During that time, Soviet did provide a significant number of defensive and offensive weapons, including the "Frog" surface-to-surface rockets with a range of 65 km, the "Scud" surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 300 km, the Sukhoi-20 fighters, the new MiG fighters, etc. (Tal, 2000, p. 161).

On February 1, 1973, The Soviet Union sent military delegation to Egypt for the first time after Soviet-Egypt diplomatic crisis of 1972. Both sides reached an agreement: The Soviet navy could continue to use Egyptian naval ports in the future. On February 7, Sadat and his Security Advisor Hafiz Ismail returned a visit to Moscow. The Soviet government was committed to supply advanced military technology and weapons to Egypt, and there was a "honeymoon" for Soviet-Egyptian relations (Kohler, Gouré, & Harvey, 1974). On February 27, General Secretary Brezhnev and Soviet Minister of Defense Andrei Grechko met Egyptian Minister of War Ismail Ali respectively in Moscow, and the talks were positive and friendly, especially it was more gratifying to Sadat that the Soviet Union restored arms sales to Egypt. In these talks, the Soviet government officials were no longer mentioning the issue of settlement of Egyptian occupied land by political means, but highlighted that Arab countries had the legitimate rights to take any means to recover the occupied land. In March 1973, Senior Soviet military delegation successfully visited Egypt, implying that the bilateral

special relations had entered a new stage of development after experiencing a setback since the mid of 1972. Soon after, The Soviet Union sold advanced "Scud" surface-to-surface missile and resent related experts to instruct Egyptian troops as to how to use the new missiles. After Egypt got those advanced weaponry, Sadat became increasingly hawkish in his foreign policy. As before the war broke out in 1973, Egypt purchased 1,000 main battle tanks from the Soviet Union, including advanced T-62 tanks; more than 1,000 armored cars, 120 helicopters, over 100 surface-to-surface Sam-2 and Sam-3 missiles, etc., which not only enhanced Egyptian defense capability but also its offense force too.

At 14:05 on October 6, 1973, Egyptian launched fierce attack against Israeli stronghold of the Eastern Suez Canal. Meanwhile, 250 Egyptian fighters crossed Balef defense line and attacked Israeli rear position, and recovered more than 3,000 square kilometers of land at East of the Suez Canal (Dupuy, 1978). According to the memories of Israeli Minister of Defense Dayan, by the first day of the outbreak of war, about 300 Egyptian tanks entered into Sinai Peninsula that Egypt had deployed along the Suez Canal. Unlike the Arab countries during the third Middle East War of 1967, Egyptians in fact, had been equipped with advanced air defense missile system and even Sam-6 fighters (Dayan, 1976). At the early stage of the war, the Soviet government didn't make comments. On October 7, the Soviet supreme leader Brezhnev, on the one hand, reached a consensus through formal diplomatic channel with the U.S. that the Soviet and Americans would never allow the conflicting parties to break out U.S.-Soviet détente; on the other hand, the Soviet government issued a formal statement for the first time accusing Israel as the chief culprit of war with expansionist ambitions and criticized that Tel Aviv failed to abide by UN Security Council Resolutions. On October 8, the Soviet Minister of Defense Andrei Grechko issued a comment on Middle East situation. During his meeting with Japanese Prime Minister, General Secretary Brezhnev issued a warning against Israel (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1987). Hence, in the early stage of the outbreak of war, Moscow generally fulfilled its security obligations to Egypt, and strongly supported Sadat administration morally and politically.

In order to avoid Egypt being defeated like the Second and Third Middle East War, on October 9, General Secretary Brezhnev sent a letter to Algerian Prime Minister Houari Boumediene, appealing Algerian government "to take any necessary measures to support Egypt and Syria and help them solve difficulties that war with Israel had brought" (Golan, 1976, p. 58). On October 9, Israel hit a Soviet cultural center building in Syria during its air strikes in Damascus, resulting in one Soviet death at least. On the second day, The Soviet Union sent more naval forces to the Mediterranean and provided Cairo with more military supplies by airlift and ocean shipping. According to the data provided by the U.S. Air Force, The Soviet Union supplied about 85,000 to 115,000 tons of materials to Egypt. To show its supports to its ally, the Nixon administration also announced to use American transport aircraft to airlift military supplies to Israel, transporting a total of 22,300 tons of supplies, including 19 M-60 tanks (Rabinnovich, 2005).

After the war entered into a stalemate, the Soviet Union began to worry about Egyptian military situation, because the Salon's troops of Israel had crossed the Suez Canal and built a firm stronghold in the west coast of Canal, directly threatening Cairo, Egyptian Capital. Therefore, the truce between Arab and Israel had been a pressing problem. On October 15, Brezhnev, Kosygin and other Soviet government officials held a politburo meeting to analyze the Middle East situation. On the evening of October 16, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Kosygin visited Cairo. To avoid arousing the vigilance of the USA and Israel, Mr. Kosygin originally planned a secret visit; however, for the purpose of getting rid of the plight, Kosygin's visit was hyped by Egyptian government and Egyptian Security Affairs Advisor Hafiz Ismail, and Soviet Ambassador to Egypt

Vinogradov and other Soviet and Egyptian officials greeted Kosygin at the airport (Israelyan, 1995). Sadat attempted to highlight Soviet supports to Egypt and prevent Israel from continuing launching military attack on Egypt.

On October 22, After Egypt-Israeli cease-fire resolution was adopted by the UN Security Council, Israel continued to attack Egyptian troops in Kissinger's acquiescence and even attempted to surround the Egyptian Third Army in Sinai Peninsula. Both General Secretary Brezhnev and Kosygin felt very angry and deemed that Nixon and Kissinger were deceiving the Soviet government (Lesch, 2003). As retaliation, The Soviet Union strengthened its supports to Egypt and Soviet-Egypt special relations reached the highest level.

Table 1

Statistics of Soviet-Egypt Delegation Visits

Year	Political purposes		Military purposes		Economical purposes		Cultural-social purposes	
	Soviet Union to Egypt	Egypt to Soviet Union	Soviet Union to Egypt	Egypt to Soviet Union	Soviet Union to Egypt	Egypt to Soviet Union	Soviet Union to Egypt	Egypt to Soviet Union
1970	6	6	1	0	2	2	12	9
1971	4	6	0	1	4	3	13	10
1972	2	6	2	2	2	2	12	13
1973	4	4	1	2	0	1	11	8
1974	3	5	0	0	3	3	14	11

Conclusion

Soviet-Egypt special relations were like "a fortress in the sand"—it seems majestic from the outside but easy to be broken from the inside, and even collapse by itself. Soviet-Egypt special relations were not only "a fortress in the sand" but also more like a "fortress engraved by sand"—lacking durability. The termination of Soviet-Egypt special relations, which was not accidental, happened in 1974 after US Secretary of State Kissinger implemented his shuttle diplomacy between Israel and Egypt, which started the Middle East peace process. Firstly, Mr. Kissinger had an outstanding diplomatic art and communication skills, and reestablished U. S. prestige through starting Egypt-Israeli negotiation and cutting Soviet influence in Middle East, so that it was the major reason for the termination of the Soviet-Egypt special relations during Sadat administration. As it was hard for the Soviet Union to meet Egyptian core demands, Egypt sided with the U.S. and developed a friendly relation with U.S. From the point of mutual trust, the termination of Soviet-Egypt special relations was mainly affected by Leaders' personalities of two sides.

On the whole, Soviet-Egypt special relations were not a successful diplomatic activity. It was worthy of reflection that almost all Soviet special relations with the developing countries ended up with termination or crisis, such as its special ties with Somalia, Ethiopia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, China, Vietnam, Albania, etc., during the Cold War.

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Focus on the Crucial Elections in the Netherlands, France, and Germany: The Macron-Merkel Ship Sets Sail to Rebuild the EU

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In the past three years from 2015 through 2017, Europe has been confronted by the multiple challenges of terror attacks, Greek debt crisis, strains caused by a massive influx of migrants, Brexit and the America First Policy of US President Trump. These tensions are generating strong pressures to rebuild the EU. In France, the ambitious centrist Emmanuel Macron at the age of 39, staved off the challenge of the far right Marine Le Pen to win a crushing victory in the May 2017 presidential election. Macron has been dubbed the third transformative president in the footsteps of Charles de Gaulle and François Mitterrand. Macron afterwards laid out his vision for rebuilding the EU in a speech at the Sorbonne in Paris. In the German federal election, the CDU/CSU, led by Angela Merkel, plunged to 33% of the vote and its coalition partner the center-left SPD, suffered a historic defeat with only 22%. The xenophobic nationalist alternative for Germany conversely rose to become the third largest party in the Bundestag with 94 seats and 12.6%. But after many twists and turns, the Macron-Merkel ship has set sail in quest of an "annus mirabilis" that will herald a new age in 2018.

Keywords: influx of migrants, Brexit, rebuilding the EU, xenophobia

Introduction

Europe has recently been struggling with the thorny issues of the massive influx of migrants, terror attacks, and the Greek debt crisis from 2015 through 2017. In addition, Europe is now also confronted by Brexit and the America First policies of the U.S. President, Donald Trump. These difficult challenges have focused attention on the series of important elections that took place in the Netherlands, France, and Germany in 2017.

France was the country which took the initiative in European reconstruction after the Second World War. In 1950, then French Foreign Minister Robert Shuman advocated the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community. France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux countries, namely the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg joined the community in 1951. This war renouncing community marked the first great step toward the economic and political integration of Europe leading on to the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 which established the European Economic Community. The EEC developed into the EC and then the European Union (EU) in 1993. The reconciliation of France and Germany and the Élysée treaty (Franco German friendship and cooperation treaty) of 1963 has been groundwork to support the European integration.

In this context, I wish to consider the ongoing series of elections in major EU member countries in 2017. These elections follow Britain's decision to leave the EU, and the Brexit negotiations are underway. The

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referendum on whether Britain should remain a member of the European Union or leave was called by then Prime Minister David Cameron in June 2016. That decision was triggered by the victory of anti-EU and anti-immigrant far right UKIP in the EU's European Parliament election of 2014, when it defeated both of the two major parties, the Conservatives and Labour. The EU has responded cautiously so far to this first ever withdrawal from the EU by a member state but the current EU leaders have made it clear that they are determined to handle it in a united manner.

Greek debt crisis (euro-zone debt crisis) which derived from euro crisis in 2009 should also be mentioned as reference. This surfaced when the radical left Syriza led Tsipras government was born in the general election in January, 2015. Greece which received bailing out from the EU and the IMF had to repay arrears from the IMF in June but had no resources to repay them. Facing default and Grexit—Greek withdrawal from the euro-zone, Tsipras government eventually accepted EU's conditions, including the sale of 50 billion euro's worth of national assets, and could receive emergency bailout from the EU. Fear of Grexit has waned accordingly.

US President Trump's America First Policy has meanwhile overturned various established American policies in: (1) his refusal to remain in Paris Agreement on the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions; and (2) his withdrawal from TPP agreement. It was also widely feared that Trump's America First Policy could further encourage populist forces in the rest of Europe and have an unwelcome influence on the election.

Table 1

Major Elections in Europe in 2017-2018

State	Date	
The Netherlands	March 15, 2017	General election
France	April 23, 2017	Presidential election, first-round
	May 7, 2017	Second round (run-off)
Britain	June 8, 2017	General election
Germany	September 24, 2017	Federal election
Austria	October 15, 2017	General election
Italy	March 4, 2018	General election

The Dutch Election

Attention in the Netherlands was focused on whether the pro-EU center-right People's party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) would be able to defend its position as the largest party or be overtaken by the far-right Party for Freedom (PVV). The Netherlands has a multi-party system of many small parties and it would be very hard for any party there to win an overall majority of the 150-seat Lower House.

In the event, Geert Wilders' far-right, anti-immigration and anti-EU party, the PVV, finished second in spite of increasing its representation from 15 seats to 20. The center-right People's Party garnered 33 seats to defend its standing as the largest party in the house. Even with 8 seats fewer than its pre-election total of 41, this placed it in a position to form a coalition government together with several smaller parties, including the Christian Democrats (CDA) and progressive liberal D66. Contrary to the fear that the wave of populism might sweep up public opinion across the rest of Europe, the results of the Dutch parliamentary election suggested that the populist movements might at last be losing some of their momentum. The VVD, led by Prime Minister Mark Rutte, reached an agreement with the CDA, D66 and small, faith-based CU to form a coalition agreement in October after lengthy negotiations.

Table 2

Dutch General Election of March 15, 2017

Party	Party	Seats	+-(2012)
VVD	Peoples' Party for Freedom and Democracy	33	-8
PVV	Party for Freedom	20	+5
CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal	19	+6
D66	Democrats 66	19	+7
SP	Socialist Party	14	-1
PvdA	Labour Party	9	-29
CU	Christian Union	5	
Others		15	

Source: The Economist (2017).

French Presidential Election—Centrist Staved off the Far Right Challenge

The first round of the crucial French presidential election followed in April, 2017 with the second round run-off in May amidst those same, multiple challenges—the massive influx of migrants, terror attacks, Brexit, and widespread populist sentiment.

The election resulted in victory for the independent centrist Emmanuel Macron, who was elected ahead of the far-right Marine Le Pen of the National Front. The essential question now for France has become whether the new president can revitalize his stagnant and divided nation while also remolding the crisis-ridden EU.

Macron won the run-off vote with 66 percent versus 34 percent for Marine Le Pen (Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2017a). Under the French electoral system, if no candidate wins an overall majority in the first round of voting, then a run-off vote is held between the top two finishers. Macron won with a large margin but, even so, Marine Le Pen's share was nearly double the 17.79%, her father had won in his 2002 run-off against Jacques Chirac, who took 82.2% that time. Macron's victory was, even so, hailed by his supporters for holding back the rising tide of populism in the wake of the Brexit vote and U.S. presidential election. In the first round, Emmanuel Macron had come first with 24.01% of the vote, followed by Marine Le Pen with 21.3%, François Fillon (center-right Republican) 20.01%, Jean-Luc Mélenchon (left wing) 19.58%, and Benoît Hamon (center-left Socialist) 6.36% (Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2017b).

Macron, a former investment banker and Minister of Economic Affairs under President Hollande ran as an independent centrist, neither left nor right. At the age of 39, he is France's youngest leader since even before Napoleon III, who took power at the age of 40. In the 5th Republic, French politics had so far been dominated by the establishment parties of the center-left and center right. Macron's win has ended this decades-long tradition. The turnout was 74.56%, with 25.44% abstaining, 6.35% blank ballot papers, and 2.24% declared null. The high abstention rate indicates that not all supporters of the traditional mainstream parties transferred their backing to Macron and some who did no doubt cast their votes less for him than against Marine Le Pen.

Even so, the trends of the first and second rounds of voting revealed that the ebbing of support for the traditional mainstream parties in France had paved the way not, in fact, for the far-right but instead for an independent centrist who lacked political experience but offered strong emotional appeal.

Macron's new party, *La République en marche* (Republic on the Move) won a landslide victory in the election for the 577-seat National Assembly. I personally sense that some sort of political revolution is starting to brew for the first time since de Gaulle established the 5th Republic in 1958.

Today, France is not merely a nation state but also a core leader of the European Union. President Macron will assuredly make a determined effort to reinvigorate and reorganize the EU as well as France in tackling its multiple crises. His first strong wish was unveiled in his address to the EU-flag-waving, cheering crowd in the courtyard of the Louvre Museum. Macron pledged to defend France and Europe. He promised to pull the economy out of the stagnation and unite a divided and fractured France. He appeared in front of the crowd to the strains of the European anthem, the "Ode to Joy" from Beethoven's 9th Symphony. Did they feel the first stirrings of a new age and the hope that they would soon be able to break the shackles of the past?

President Macron, pro-EU and founder of the grassroots movement, *En marche*, was inaugurated on May 14 and nominated Edouard Philippe (Republican) to serve as his prime minister. He set out two main directions for his administration. At home, as the centrist president, he targeted some degree of deregulation, including labor market reforms. He is also seeking to boost investment in job creation and support welfare for the underprivileged. Macron pledged to reduce unemployment to seven percent. In order to boost growth and create jobs, he has to send out new messages that will encourage both foreign and domestic enterprises to invest in France. In southern Europe in general, France included, job growth has all too often been achieved simply by employing more civil servants.

French GDP growth is showing an upward trend and rose to 1.7% in the second quarter of 2017, bringing it closer to Germany's 2.1% (Eurostat, 2017a). The unemployment rate dropped to 9.7% in September 2017, down from 9.9% in 2016. For three decades now, it has been hovering around the 10% mark. Youth unemployment is particularly high, standing at 23.3% among 15 to 24 years old, according to the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). The budget deficit as a ratio of GDP has fallen near to the three percent limit of the convergence criteria set by the EU. It dropped to 3.4% in 2016, down 0.2% from 3.6% in 2015, or by 0.5% from the 3.9% recorded in 2014 (Eurostat, 2017b).

In regard to reconstructing the EU, Macron is proposing the creation of a common euro-zone budget, a euro-zone finance minister, and a euro-zone assembly. I will take up Macron's idea on the reform of the euro zone later when considering the importance of the Sorbonne speech. His proposal is that Europe needs its own budget to finance common investments and maintain stability when the zone is confronted by economic shocks.

In Macron, France may now have found its third transformative president. Like the previous two, Charles de Gaulle and François Mitterrand, Macron has the ambition to be more than simply a president (Tiersky, 2018). Macron evinces a sense of personal destiny, one that is bound up with his idea of how the 21st century France has to be. He has a vision for the profound transformation of the EU into a sovereign, united and democratic Europe that will play a crucial role in the international order.

French National Assembly Election—The Traditional Parties Are Swept Aside

The election for the lower house of the National Assembly was held in June 2017. France is a diarchy. The president has powers to dissolve the National Assembly and appoint and dismiss the prime minster, and also controls defense and diplomacy. At the same time, because of the parliamentary system of government, the president needs to consolidate his power base in parliament.

Under the French legislative electoral system, if no candidate wins an overall majority in the first round, then those who win more than 12.6% of votes go into the second round to vie for winning the most votes. The first round this time was held on June 11 and the second round, on June 18.

To push through his ambitious reforms, Macron had to build a majority in the 577-seat parliament. To achieve this, he turned the grass-root movement, *En marche*, into a political party, *La République en marche* (Republic on the Move), as a way to consolidate his power base. Republic on the Move won a sweeping overall majority of 308 seats out of the 577. Together with its 42-seat centrist ally, the Democratic Movement (MoDem), Macron's camp garnered 350 seats or 61% of the total (Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2017c). Of the 308 seats won by Republic on the Move, many were won by young people, women and other citizens with no or very little previous political experience. And 39% of the party's winning candidates were female. This election dealt another blow to the traditional mainstream Socialist and Republican parties. The center-right Republicans garnered 112 seats. Together with the 18 seats of the Union of Democrats and Independents, this right-wing party became the largest opposition group.

The left-wing Socialist Party suffered a stunning, historic defeat in tumbling from 280 seats won in the previous election to only 30 seats this time. President Hollande was the secretary-general of this party. The far-right National Front won 8 seats, including one for its head Marine Le Pen. Republic on the Move also effectively staved off the challenge from Marine Le Pen. The left-wing *La France insoumise* (Unbowed France), led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, obtained 17 seats. Macron also secured his power base in the National Assembly, where his Republic on the Move and its ally, Modem, won 350 seats or 61% of the 577-seat total. This all gives Macron one of the biggest majorities ever enjoyed by any president in the modern French state.

We also need to look at the patterns of abstention. The abstention rates were 51.30% in the first and 57.36% in the second round of voting in the legislative election. That 57.36% was the highest rate of abstention since the current 5th Republic was born in 1958. The French newspaper, *Le Monde* (17 June, 2017), observed that the abstentions only kept on growing. The respective rates were 36% in 2002, 40% in 2007, and 43% in 2012. *Le Monde* observed that the elections of 2017 were in fact only a continuation of the trend. It also suggested after the presidential election that the reduction of voter mobilization may have been a factor behind the abstentions. This surely, at any rate, reflects mixed reactions to the Macron phenomenon. As noted already, Republic on the Move recruited many of its candidates from outside the political establishment. They are the young, women, and ordinary citizens, and some voters may have struggled to find any candidate who truly represented themselves.

Table 3

National Assembly (Main Parties, Seats, Political Leanings From Left to Right)

French Communist Party	10	Far-left
France Unbowed	17	Left-wing
Socialist Party	30	Center-left
Radical Party of the Left	3	Center-left
Ecology/Greens	1	Center-left
Republic on the Move	308	Center
Democratic Movement	42	Center
Union of Democrats and Independents	18	Center to center-right
Republicans	112	Center-right
National Front	8	Far-right
Others	28	
Total number of seats	577	

Source: *Ministère de l'Intérieur, Résultats des élections législatives 2017*. Author's assessment of political leanings for reference use.

IV—German Federal Election—The Ruling Coalition Collapses, Then Reforms

Following the French national elections, a federal election was held in Germany, Europe's biggest economic power and the other remaining core leader of the EU, in September, 2017. The election attracted EU-wide attention with the focus on whether Angela Merkel would be able to govern as chancellor for a fourth term and work to reconstruct the EU arm-in-arm with Macron.

The CDU/CSU alliance led by Angela Merkel plunged to a low of 33% with 246 seats but retained its position as the largest party. The Social Democratic Party (SPD)—its two-time coalition partner—suffered a sharp fall to 20.5% and 153 seats. This was a stunning, historic loss for SPD unrivalled in the modern state counting from the first national election in West Germany in 1949. SPD head Martin Schulz declared an end to the grand coalition and led his party into the ranks of the opposition. The CDU/CSU and SPD lost 65 and 40 seats, respectively, from the previous election (Bundestagswahl, 2017).

On the right, the anti-immigrant, anti-EU far right Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland*) obtained 12.6 percent and 94 seats to become the third largest party. The anti-immigrant, anti-EU far right AfD, founded in April 2013 by a conservative elite, won no seats in the previous election of September, 2013.

Before discussing the causes of the mainstream parties' defeat, I would like to refer to some precursors. There was a foretaste of the ebbing of CDU support in a regional election of September 2016 on Merkel's home territory of Mecklenburg Vorpommern, when the CDU fell from second place to third and AfD leapfrogged the CDU into second. The SPD won the most seats. This was the first indication at the ballot box that the established, mainstream parties were on the ebb and its major cause was Merkel's generous decision to open the doors to a massive influx of refugees from the war-torn Middle East and North Africa. Germany received one million migrants under this humanitarian policy in 2015 and this evidently produced a backlash from certain citizens, especially in such regions as the former East Germany.

In December 2015, in Cologne, a number of asylum seekers (migrants) from North Africa were reported to have been involved in sexual misconduct against women. In December 2016, in Berlin, a large truck plowed into the Christmas market killing 12 people, driven by a Tunisian suspect who is reported to have entered Berlin as a migrant during the influx. He was shot dead after being stopped for questioning by Italian police near Milan. Against this sort of background, it is easy to conceive how Merkel's decision to open the doors to migrants may have opened the way for a xenophobic nationalist backlash against migrants.

The SPD's large losses have been attributed to the invisibility of the party's policies inside the coalition. The impact of deregulation and labour market flexibility may also be cited. These structural changes originated in SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's labor market reforms (Schröder, 2010), which had the aim of creating temporary employment, notably in poorly paid, short-term jobs, to offset the sharp increase in unemployment in the former East Germany soon after the reunification of Germany in 1990. Such deregulation and labor market reform were necessary in the face of globalization but also gradually widened the gap between the rich and the poor, and between unskilled workers and the globalized elite. It is anyhow only natural, of course, for people's political loyalties to shift over time.

In Germany, structural reform has led to steady growth, lower unemployment and strong export growth (Eurostat shows an unemployment rate of only 3.6% in September, 2017, as compared to 8.9% for the 19 euro-zone members), and budget expenditure in 0.8% surplus, well inside the 3% deficit criterion. Despite this strong economic outlook, however, many citizens do feel increasingly aware of the differences between the

different types of employment. This tendency is not limited, of course, to Germany.

Germany is regarded as the most stable and prosperous country in Europe today but the distortions triggered by the massive influx of migrants and wave of populism sweeping Europe have become focal points of attention.

Table 4

Main Parties, Seats, Ratios, Political Leanings

CDU—Christian Democratic Union	200	26.8%	Center-right
SPD—Social Democratic Party	153	20.5	Center-left
AfD—Alternative for Germany	94	12.6	Nationalist
FDP—Free Democratic Party	80	10.7	Liberal
DIE LINK—Left Party	69	9.2	Left
GRÜNE—Alliance'90/Greens	67	8.9	Green
CSU—Christian Social Union	46	6.2	Center-left

Source: Bundestagswahl 2017: Endgültiges Ergebnis.

Let's now look at how the new government is being formed. As a result of the SPD's refusal to renew the grand coalition in the aftermath of its crushing defeat, Merkel (CDU/CSU) entered talks with the market-oriented FDP and the Greens in an effort to form what was called Jamaika coalition, so named after the party colors of black for the CDU, yellow for the FDP, and green for the Greens. Those talks, which began in November, 2017, broke down after four weeks.

As those efforts to form a new government came to a standstill, President Frank-Walter Steinmeier next called on all parties to work together in forming a new government. He met with both Merkel and SPD head Martin Schulz to this effect. On January 21, 2018, the SPD, which had previously ruled out joining hand with the CDU/CSU, held a special Party Congress where 56 percent of the delegates voted in favor of opening formal talks with Merkel's CDU/CSU.

Reports from Berlin promised that if and when talks did produce a formal agreement, all SPD members would be asked to approve the final deal by postal ballot. There were, however, 464,000 members and the youth wing were against a deal.

Merkel and SPD head Schulz eventually reached their grand coalition agreement on February 7. Reports of internal squabbles continued, however, and Schulz himself suddenly stepped aside. Even so, Merkel's concession of three key ministerial positions—Foreign, Finance and Labour—to the SPD does seem likely to secure the deal.

On March 4, 2018, an SPD official announced that 78% of members had voted and 66% were in favor of forming a coalition government and ending the more than five months of wrangling and political vacuum. Merkel's fourth-term government was thus set to sail in March.

Merkel's concessions, as I understand, will provide a good occasion for the SPD to help govern the nation not as a junior but as a full and equal partner. The big concessions Merkel has made in ceding ministerial posts to the SPD will open up the way for it to realize some of its policy aims and present its true face to the German people. The party's acting head, Olaf Sholz, stated in an interview with *Der Spiegel*, published on February 10, that Germany should not dictate economic policies to its euro-zone partners. At that time, Mr. Sholz is widely expected to succeed Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble, advocacy of austerity. Hamburg City Mayor Sholz's remark may be indicative of an impending shift in the belt-tightening policy as the SPD now comes to

the fore in such matters. That is what Merkel's painful concessions to the SPD have cost her in order to stay at the helm. If the deal fails, the only remaining options will be a minority government or new election. Merkel government took office in March and Sholz is now Finance Minister.

The die has been cast. Merkel's choice has been to build a coalition with the SPD. In addition to handing the SPD the key financial and foreign policy and labor posts, the CDU/CSU has also agreed to a coalition blueprint in which Germany supports the ambitious reform drive of French President Macron and the European Commission (*The African Courier*, 2018)

Germany vows, in close partnership with France, to strengthen and reform the euro-zone sustainably so that the euro can better withstand global crises. This suggests a departure from outgoing finance minister Wolfgang Schaeuble's policy of maintaining austerity policy, though both parties have agreed to maintain a balanced budget.

Conclusions

In the past three years, from 2015 through 2017, Europe has been confronted by the multiple challenges of terror attacks, strains caused by a massive influx of migrants, Brexit, and the America First policies of US President Trump. Each of these three years could be termed an "annus-horribilis". Amidst this series of crises, much attention became focused on the national elections of two core leading EU member countries, France, and Germany.

In France, the obscure but ambitious centrist Emmanuel Macron won a crushing victory in the presidential election at the age of only 39 by staving off the challenge of the far-right National Front and its head Marine Le Pen. Macron then hastily assembled his own political party, Republic on the Move and won a sweeping majority in the National Assembly election. Macron has been dubbed the third transformative president after Charles de Gaulle and François Mitterrand. He was even heralded as "Europe's Saviour" on the cover of *The Economist* in June 2017. The two traditional mainstream parties both suffered spectacular falls in support.

The results of the German federal election also produced sharp setbacks for the two traditional mainstream parties of the CDU/CSU and SPD, which won 33.0% and 20.5% of the votes, respectively. In particular, the SPD suffered its most historic defeat of the post-war era since West Germany was established in 1949. Conversely, the nationalist anti-immigrant and anti-EU party, Alternative for Germany, won 12.6% votes amidst the rising populist wave swelling across Europe. The grand CDU/CSU and SPD coalition had steered the nation and the EU, based on Franco-German partnership for eight years until then.

Let us consider, then, how these two core nations will now try to rebuild the EU. Two days after the German election of Sept. 24, 2017, President Macron laid out his vision for rebuilding the EU at Sorbonne University in Paris. His speech *de facto* depicted the EU as entering a period of profound transformation caused by the multiple challenges and the populism now raging through Europe.

The president detailed his comprehensive policies for reconstructing Europe that would be sovereign, united, and democratic. He called for the establishment of a common "intervention force" and common asylum agency, and the creation of European universities. Macron said Europe is too weak, slow, and inefficient, but Europe also has unique capabilities to act in the world to confront major contemporary challenges.

Macron proposed that Europe needs its own budget to finance more investment and underpin stability when economic shocks arrive. Such a budget must, further, be placed under the strong political guidance of a common minister and be subject to strict parliamentary control at the European level. Chancellor Merkel and

President Macron met in Paris on March 16 for the first time since Merkel was reappointed. It is reported that they agreed to formulate a roadmap of euro-zone reform before the end of June in 2018. This is expected to aim at improving the competitiveness of the euro currency zone.

In the wake of migration, especially, Europe is now embattled by the rise of nationalism and populism. In the Austrian general election of 2017, the Freedom Party even became the first far-right party to enter government in the post-war period. In Italy's elections for its two houses of parliament in March 2018, none of the three major party alliance was able to win a majority. The country split three ways between the center-right allies of Berlusconi et al., anti-establishment Five Star Movement, and center-left led by Renzi.

The new Macron-Merkel ship has, therefore, set out in quest of an "annus mirabilis" that will herald a new age in 2018.

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Inter-caste Marriage in Eastern Nepal: Context and Its Consequences

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This study explores the current situation of inter-caste marriage in Eastern Nepal. It is based on a sample of 30 inter-caste couples collected in Sunsari District. It basically describes the extent and pattern of inter-caste marriage and responsible factors to be engaged in inter-caste marriage among diverse social groups. Inter-caste marriage is not only a matter of individual relation; it is also a matter of society and social transformation from traditional to modern. Love and affection, age factors, good moral character of the lower caste, modernization, migration, education, mass media, and identity based moments are taken major motivational factors for inter-caste marriage. Inter-caste couples are victimized from various factors of traditional society; they are facing different kinds of problems from their family, relatives, and society. Family problems, social problems, cultural problems, and psychological problems are the common for them.

Keywords: caste, inter-caste marriage, endogamy, hyper gamy, hypo gamy

Introduction

Social stratification is the ordering of social differences with the help of a set of criteria or just a single criterion which ties the differentiated strata into a system (Gupta, 2000). Caste groups are closed social groups: One may only marry within one's caste (Quigley, 1999), also called endogamous marriage. As Dumont (1980) explained, endogamy is essential to the caste system and to caste identity because of the caste system, regulation of hierarchy through ritual pollution and purity. In other words, caste hierarchy is maintained through endogamous marriage or the marriage within (sub-caste) groups in this system (Kansakar & Ghimire, 2008). In this sense, inter-caste marriage poses challenge to the orthodox of caste primarily because it brings to exclusive and endogamous sub-caste groups in relationship, creates kinship, and gives a comparable social position.

Caste is a form of social stratification characterized by endogamy, hereditary transmission of a lifestyle which often includes occupation, ritual status in a hierarchy, and customary social interaction and exclusion based on cultural notion of purity and pollution. As Dumont (1980) explained, endogamy is essential to the caste system and to caste identity because of the caste system regulation of hierarchy through ritual pollution and purity. But Dumont's notion was criticized as it failed to explain the social change, dynamism, and individualistic strivings (that can and does take place) even within the orthodox Hindu way to living. Berreman (1972) criticized the Dumont's notion that power and economic factors are distinct and epiphenomenal to caste.

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In Nepal the system of caste is still a predominant system of social stratification and inequality. The 1854 legal code prescribed severe punishment for hypogamy. Caste plays a very important role in the selection of mates in marriage. But, nowadays, there are increases in the trend of inter-caste marriage in the society. The urban residence, education, employment in modern occupation, and middle class economic background have tended to be set of attributes affecting the incidence of inter-caste marriage. Inter-caste married couples are looked upon as social deviants and usually punished for rejecting the prevalent norms of society.

Marriage is considered as a social, religious, spiritual, and/or legal union of individuals. It is an institution in which interpersonal relationships (usually intimidate and sexual) are acknowledged by the state by religious authority of both society and state. Marriage is a central family process in Nepal, as it is in many other countries of the world (Bennett, 1983; Frick, 1986; Watkins, 1996). Marriage in Nepal historically has been under the strict control of the family (Barber, 2004). An individual's family decides when and whom he or she would marry (Folmar, 1992). Inter-caste marriage (ICM) is a marriage between spouses of different ethnicities and castes. It is related to exogamy, where marriage is allowed only outside of a social group and opposed to endogamous. Inter-caste marriage has been perceived as one of the most practical ways to blur caste lines and render them irrelevant (Wax, 2008). It is also considered as the means of social inclusion as it helps increase inter-caste cooperation and integration between Dalits and non-Dalits (NPC, 2007). There are debates and dissensions among Dalits and non-Dalits scholars regarding the nature and impact of incentives on the inter-caste couple (Biswakarma, 2013).

Normally, inter-caste marriage means the marriage of two people from different caste groups. However, the general convention of inter-caste marriage usually denotes the marriage between Dalits and non-Dalits in Nepal. Nevertheless, in this dissertation, the author has attempted to define inter-caste marriage not only as the marriage between Dalits and non-Dalits, but as a union of male and female from two distinct castes and ethnic groups. In this context, the focus of this study is to analyze the extent and pattern of inter-caste marriage. Especially, this study was guided for seeking answers to the following research question:

(1) What are the extent and pattern of inter-caste marriage among diverse social groups?

(2) What are the factors that are responsible to be engaged in inter-caste marriage among diverse social groups?

(3) What types of problems are faced by inter-caste couple after their marriage?

(4) How is the practice of inter-caste marriage contributing toward transforming caste relation?

Materials and Methods

This study is based on urban area of Eastern Development Region. Itahari is a beautiful and multicultural town of Eastern Nepal. It lies on Sunsari District and Koshi Zone. The units of analysis of this study are hypergamous and hypogenous couples. A total of 30 couples were purposively selected as respondents for this study; because of the small sample size and the non-feasibility of random sampling, the study basically used qualitative methods with in-depth interview of interview of inter-caste married couples.

This study entertains both primary as well as secondary data. The primary data have been collected from the field through in-depth interview, based on checklist, case study, and key-informant interview. The data were analyzed in qualitative ways. Qualitative data were analyzed by using thematic analysis based on key-research question. A good thematic code is one that captures the qualitative richness of the phenomenon. It is usable in the analysis, the interpretation, and presentation of research (Boyatzis, 1998).

Result and Discussion

Situation of the Inter-caste Marriage

The national population census report 2012 has identified 125 caste/ethnic groups and 10 religious groups in Nepal (CBS, 2012). Inter-caste married couples were categorized into different 10 social groups as per the definition of the CBS: Pahadi, Madhesi Dalit, Pahadi Bahun, Chhetri/Takuri, Pahadi Janajati, Madhesi, Bahun/Chhetri (B/C), Madhesi middle caste, Mulim (religious groups), and others (Dashnami). This study interviewed with 30 couples. Among them 16 couples were hypogamous (low caste male marrying with high caste female) and 14 couples were hypergamous (high caste male marring with low caste female) couples. They were studied comparatively. Hypogamous marriage is increasing more than hypergamous marriage. The reason behind this is if a low caste man marries a high caste girl, his family will easily accept them, whereas if a high caste male marries a low caste girl, his family will reject them and will not permit them to stay at home. Therefore, hypogamous marriage was found more in numbers than the hypergamous one in the study area.

Social Groups and Inter-caste Marriage

The national population census report 2012 has identified 125 caste/ethnic groups and 10 religious groups in Nepal (CBS, 2012). Inter-caste married couples were categorized in different ten social groups as per the definition of the CBS: Pahadi, Madhesi Dalit, Pahadi Bahun, Chhetri/Takuri, Pahadi Janajati, Madhesi, Bahun/Chhetri (B/C), Madhesi middle caste, Mulim (religious groups), and others (Dashnami). In terms of this social group, they were found to be four Bahun/Chhetri marrying with Pahadi Dalit, three Pahadi Janjati men marrying with Pahadi Dalits, and only one Pahadi Janajati men marrying with Terai Dalit. Similarly, four Bahun/Chhetri men married with Pahadi ethnic whereas three Pahadi ethnic men married with Chhetri/Bahun. Similrly, seven, two, and one Pahadi Dalit men were found to have married with Bahun/Chhetri, Pahadi Janajati, and Muslim respectively whereas only one Terai Dalit men married with Pahadi ethnic. Two Muslim men were found to have married with Bahun/Chhetri and two Muslim men married with Pahadi ethnic girls.

Religious Background of Inter-caste Couples

This study explores the situation of inter-caste marriage with lower caste from the religious perspective. In this study, in terms of religion, 20 (66.6%) husbands were Hindus, six (20%) were Christian, and four (13.3%) were Muslim; there were no Buddhist. Similarly, 19 (63.3%) wives were Hindus, four (13.3%) were Christians, and one (3.3%) was Muslim. After inter-caste marriage, six (20%) wives changed their religion and adopted their husbands' religion. According to the religions belief, the data show that inter-caste marriage is high among the Hindus, followed by in the Christians and in the Muslim.

Educational Status and Inter-caste Marriage

Overall literacy rate (for population aged five years and above) of Nepal has increased from 54.1 percent in 2001 to 65.9 percent in 2011. Male literacy rate is 75.1 percent compared to female literacy rate of 57.4 percent. This highest literacy rate is reported in Kathmandu district (86.3%) and lowest (47.8%) in Humla (CBS, 2011). Data on educational status of couples showed that most of the couples in hypogamy were concentrated at lower secondary, secondary, intermediate, and bachelor level education and there was higher percentage of educated men (bachelor level) in hypergamy than in hypogamy, in hypergamy although there was higher percentage of women with primary level education. In case of hypogamy, there was higher

concentration of women in secondary level and the number of women with intermediate and bachelor level was also significant (see Table 1).

Table 1

Level of Education of Hypergamous and Hypogamous Couples

Level of education	Hypergamy				Hypogamy			
	No. of men	Percent	No. of women	Percent	No. of men	Percent	No. of women	Percent
Illiterate	1	7.14	1	7.14	1	6.25	2	12.50
Primary	1	7.14	5	35.71	3	18.75	2	12.50
L. Secondary	1	7.14	2	14.28	3	18.75	2	12.50
Secondary	3	21.42	3	21.42	3	18.75	5	31.23
Intermediate	2	14.28	1	7.14	2	12.50	2	12.50
Bachelor	5	35.71	1	7.14	4	25.00	2	12.50
Master	1	7.14	1	7.14	-	-	1	6.25
Total	14	100.00	14	100.00	16	100.00	16	100.00

Note. Source: Field Study, 2016.

Responsible Factors of Inter-caste Marriage

Inter-caste marriages that are not arranged by the families eventually counter against capitalist values of wealth, power, and status. According to Baraili (2005), marriage in Nepal are controlled by property, religion, casteism, social customs, and traditions and they are feudalistic in nature and individual decision and independent marriages are not tolerated. Inter-caste married couples are often taken as social deviants and usually punished for rejecting the prevalent norms of the society. Some couples may be barred from the participation in normal activities in family and society while other couples may be deprived of social relation. Of course, there are certain factors that are responsible for inter-caste marriage. Some major factors informed by the couples and key informants are highlighted here and these factors are categorized as internal and external factors.

Internal Factors

Internal factors denote the self-feeling and concept of person who is willing to marry with low caste without influence of outsiders. One's own self interest, need, and desire are found important in the inter-caste marriage. These factors are follows:

(1) Love and affection: Love and affection is one of the major factors of inter-caste marriage; without love and attraction, no one can imagine inter-caste marriage. Since the parents give their son or daughter marrige beyond their traditional caste barriers can hardly be imagined in Nepali society;

(2) Age factor: Age factor also determines the inter-caste marriage. Majority of the couples are found to have fallen in love during their teenage. Teenage is itself an age of attraction with opposite sex, moreover, the teenagers do not have any family and social burden. They are ideal rather practical. Their emotionality ideology and self thought drive towards the relationship with their colleagues or friends;

(3) Good moral character, honesty and sincerity of lower caste youth: The high caste girls who married with low caste informed that they were highly beloveds. The non-Dalit girls were thus impressed with the Dalit boy whom they knew as having good moral character, honesty, and sincerity. Due to such characters, they impressed and fell in love and finally they had married.

External Factors

Unlike personal cause, there is also the external factor, which is directly playing the role for motivating to inter-caste marriage. Capitalism and mode of production is changing the form of marriages: New people are beginning to feel more comfortable with the love marriage (Mishra, 2010). For the purpose of this study, the factors appearing at the global arena and at the broader macro level are considered external ones.

(1) Modernization, westernization, and sanskritization: Modernization westernization, and sanskritization have its influence on the culture and life style of people. Especially new generation has adopted the western culture, such as dressing up, listening English music, eating and seating, making boy/girl friends, etc. A few scholars have addressed the issue of inter-caste relations and intermarriage between high caste group and Janajatis within the frameworks of the modernization and sanskritization thesis (Sharma, 1977). The modernization thesis generally views intermarriages positively since intermixing and intermarriage are taken to be signs of the crumbling caste system, the remnant of "traditional" society. Moreover, implicit in the sanskritization thesis is the assumption that intermarriage is a manifestation of the "desire" on the part of lower castes to upgrade their caste status. In this formulation, intermarriage is thought of as having beneficial consequences for "national culture" and integration;

(2) Migration and new social relation: Migration of people such as those from hill to Tarai and rural to urban is also found to be playing the crucial role for inter-caste marriage. People, who come from the hill to Tarai, need to make good relationship with native people. During this course, they do not know each other in detail. They have to get and give support, later they become the intimate neighbor;

(3) Changing pattern on caste-based occupation: In Nepali society occupation also becomes the matter of prestige still they acquire no dignity out of their caste based traditional occupation according to Nepali culture. Those Dalits who are continuing their caste based occupation as ironsmith, cobbler, and tailor are perceived as low profile jobs and they are facing more discrimination compared to those Dalits who are not involved in their caste based occupation when Dalits give their occupation, the relationship like master and servant also ends;

(4) Modern education: Education is a key to reducing spread of inequality. In Nepal, lower caste educational status is increasing compared to past days. Their school enrollment is increasing in recent days. Due to the enrollment in school and college, they can interact with higher caste and have friendship with them. Additionally, educated Dalits have more possibility to inter-caste marriage with non-Dalits;

(5) New social movement: A social movement a collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites opponents and authorities (Tarrow, 1944). In recent days in Nepal, new social movement is increasing in every part of the society. Dalits movement is increasing in every part of the society. Dalits movement, ethnic movement, feminist movement, and other movement for equality and freedom are also motivating youth in inter-caste marriage. More importantly, while they are tortured and are forced to separate, the inter-caste couple can get moral and legal support from these organizations, which are working for human rights and justice. These also are the external factors, which motivate people for inter-caste marriage;

(6) Mass media: Mass media have been playing a vital role to gear up the pace of modern development and to accelerate the speed of well-cultured and aptly civilized human society. In recent years, people's access is increasing in media. Numbers of print media, TV channel, and FM radio also are increasing in recent days. Due to the accessibility on media and its impact, people's awareness level is increasing. People not only

become aware on human rights, gender right, personal freedom, and so on, but they (especially youth) are also influenced by entertainment programs, such as music, cinema, and love story. Due to this, youth are more motivated to have friend with opposite sex from different caste.

Problems Faced by Inter-caste Couples

Family Problem

Inter-caste married couples did not receive family support. But they have sought support and solidarity beyond one's own kith and kinds-with NGOs, civil society groups, community based organization, and so on. Some have adopted brothers, sisters, natal family maternal uncles and aunts. Inter-caste marriage usually follows no consent from the family and parents. As soon as the boy and a girl fly away to get married, the couple family, as was found, make effort to find out their whereabouts. Sometimes, the parents easily get information and sometimes they do not; as soon as they know that their children have committed and inter-caste marriage, the parents, usually from non-Dalit family, try to break the relationship with Dalit. Registering the cases with the false charges, such as kidnapping, thieving, child marriage, rapes found the common practice in this regard. While asked whether their marriage was accepted or not by non-Dalits, only five (26.31%) out of 19 couples (including hypergamous and hypogamous) said that they were accepted whereas eight (42.1%) informed that they were not accepted. Similarly, 31.57 percent were partially accepted (see Table 2).

Table 2

Accepted of Inter-caste Marriage by Non-Dalit Family (Between Dalit and non-Dalit)

Response	Frequency	Percent
Accepted	5	26.31
Not accepted	8	42.1
Partially accepted	6	31.57
Total	19	100.0

Note. Source: Field Study, 2016.

In case of intermarriage (between high caste and Janajati) and inter-religious marriage (between Muslim and Hindu), there were 100 percent couples had said they were accepted their marriage by their parents. If in marriage women accepted the Islam religion, there would be no serious problem for the Muslim to accept inter-caste marriage.

Social Problem

Marriage is not only a contract between the individuals but also between two families and their alliance linked through kinship networks (Nishimura, 1998). So the acknowledgement of the couple from relatives, friends, and neighbors is an important part of social relations. Their acknowledgement includes occasional visits and invitations during festivals and religious activities, marital and other family functions, etc. Inter-caste married couples face societal exclusion when societal attitude and behavior are negative towards them due to caste factor. The woman isolation is found higher in hypergamous marriage and isolation is one of the most painful manifestations of the domestic violence perpetrated against them. It makes a women feel that she is emotionally and socially alone, economically constrained, and culturally disconnected. This feeling and fact of not belonging are reflected in the women's poor relationship with her spouse and her lack of social interaction

with the extended family, friends, and the community.

Cultural Problem

In inter-caste marriage, majority of brides were facing adjustment problems. Particularly, in the case of hypogamy, non-Dalit women who were living with their husband's family had adjustment problem because of the different culture and their socialization process. The inter-caste married couples have faced various problems in the society culturally where they have been excluded in cultural activities. Even the priest has not visited their home in their cultural activities. As if the priests come, they have gone with fasting.

Physical and Mental Torture

Mostly, hypogamous couples suffered either physical or mental torture from the non-Dalit family, if their marriage was not accepted by the bride's side. To separate their daughter from Dalit husband, the non-Dalit family gave physical torture to couple, if non-Dalit family found the couple after marriage; they expressed anger by attacking the groom and sometimes the bride. If the couple were out of their contact, parents tried to torture the couple by threatening through phone or sending messages through a familiar person. However, these types of situations also depended on the socio-economic status of the family.

Who Helps to Inter-caste Marriage?

Inter-caste marriage is not only the concern of family. It is also a matter for society too. The acceptance and rejection of marriage by particular family are determined by the social perception and behavior to the family and couple as well. With each other in the society to accomplish the task is important. Inter-caste marriage is a challenge and the more challenge is to be settled in the family, neighbors, relatives, friends, and society with compulsory help. The respondents were asked whether they got any support in their marriage period. Act of 30 respondents, 43.33 percent respondent said that they got support from friends. Likewise, 26.66 percent respondents were not able to get any support from anyone whereas 13.33 percent couples were helped by family members and 10 percent got support from neighborhood. Only 6.66 percent couples were helped by relatives.

Table 3

Who Helped Couple When They Married?

Response	No. of couple	Percent
Family member	4	13.33
Neighborhood	3	10.00
Relatives	2	6.66
Friends	13	43.33
No anyone	8	26.66
Total	30	100.00

Note. Source: Field Study, 2016.

Impact of Inter-caste Marriage to Reduce Caste Discrimination

According to the couples, inter-caste marriage would help to slave caste based discrimination because if their son/daughter married with a lover caste, they believed that high caste would stop to discriminate to low caste whether they accepted marriage or not. Some so-called high caste families were ready to accept low caste as their son or daughter-in-law but they cannot dare because of social prestige and relatives pressures. They

used to meet out of the village. After a long time (more than decade), high caste is ready to accept low caste as their son-in-law/daughter-in-law.

Among the responded, 60 percent couples believed that inter-caste marriage helps to reduce caste based discrimination, whereas 10 percent did not believe so, likewise 23.33 percent couple believed that it could not help to reduce caste based discrimination. 6.66 percent couple said they do not know about such impact (see Table 4). Majority of couples had confidence that caste based discrimination would come to an end due to the inter-caste marriage. While few numbers of couples (10 percent) believed it would never happen. Those couple, who frequently got torture and were forced to leave their village, had such types of opinion. Likewise, some couples could not find any difference before and after marriage.

Table 4

Impact of Marriage to Reduce Caste Discrimination

Impact of marriage	Frequency	Percent
Helping to reduce caste discrimination	18	60.00
Helping to increase caste discrimination	3	10.00
Not different (same)	7	23.33
Do not know	2	6.66
Total	30	100.00

Note. Source: Field Study, 2016.

Conclusion

Caste system is a dynamic concept endogamy and hierarchy is the main features of caste system. As Dumont (1980) explained, endogamy is essential to the caste system and to caste identity because of the caste system, regulation of hierarchy through ritual pollution and purity. Hutton (1946) described a functional view of caste system for individual members, community functions, and function for the state and society as a whole. Berreman (1967) argued that caste is a peculiar institution with peculiar consequences. Love and affection, age factor, and good moral character of lower caste youth are taken major inspiring factors for inter-caste marriage. Likewise, modernization, and sanskritizatio, migration, education, identity based movement, mass media, and political ideology are some of the external factors of inter-caste marriage. Both the factors are crucial for the change of dogmatic social structure. Inter-caste couples are victimized from various factors of traditional society. They are facing different kinds of problems from their family, relatives, and society, Family problems, social problems, cultural problems, and psychological problems are the common for them. Though, the marriage between so-called upper Caste and Janjati is taken commonly from the family and society. But, the marriage between Dalit and non-dalit is not accepted by family and society. The main factor of this kind of gap is caste hierarchy (untouchability) and caste based social prestige and power. In a nutshell, inter-caste marriage can be seen as one of the major factors against caste discrimination. There is a great possibly of ending of tradition caste system from the Nepali society on the condition of acceptance of inter-caste marriage.

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Between Two Cultures : Civil Service Reform in Thailand and Indonesia

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In many Asian countries, public administration is in the process of considerable change and reform. Citizens in these countries have demanded faster, better, and cheaper public service. They have also demanded for more effective and efficient government. In order to meet these demands, the nation has to change its public management into more democratic, efficient, and citizen-oriented government. A civil service reform is needed in those countries with respect to their own social cultures.

Keywords: civil service reform, bureaucratic culture, political influences, corruption

Introduction

Culture is the reflection of the economy and politics. The dominant and newly emerging forces in the economy and politics are also embedded in culture. However, culture is neither simply the ideological reflection of current forces nor the contra distinctions in the economy and politics. It is also the accumulation of notions, customs, habits, and the like which dates back to prehistory and persists in current circumstances as long as there are transmitters and they are part of the social and psychological makeup of people within local sites.

The bureaucracy has a structure that breeds its own administrative culture. Incoming political leadership often reacts to the bureaucracy it inherits by instituting personnel purges or reorganizing or both, either to cleanse the old system and reorient it to the needs of the new dispensation, or to reshape the administrative culture and values in facilitating targeted policy and program objectives. Consequently, a new political order carries its own political culture to the regime-bureaucracy relation. As the bureaucracy accommodates and eventually trusts the new regime, an administrative culture supportive of the political leadership ensues.

Public Service Reform

In 1991, the World Bank released a report entitled "The Reform of Public Sector Management: Lesson From Experience"[1] which was drawn from the experience of the World Bank and its member countries in the 1980's and has approached civil service reform from two complementary perspectives which are: short-term cost-containment measures aimed at reforming public pay and employment systems and medium-term programs to build institutional support for cost-containment and to strengthen the government's ability to manage the civil service. For a short-term measure, the government's pay and employment reform has focused

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[1] World Bank, Country Economic Department (1991). "The Reform of Public Sector Management: Lesson from Experiences." Washington D.C.: World Bank.

on four main problems, such as:

(1) Excessive public sector wage bills, measured both by the ratio of personnel expenditures to government revenues or total expenditures and by the degree to which were personnel recurrent expenditures are crowded out by wages;

(2) Surplus[2] civil service staff, with "surplus" defined by a range of measures and rates, including the member of civil servants in relation to the member of participants in the modern sector labor forces, and by operating budgets too low to support the current member of employees;

(3) Salary erosion, that is declines in wages that reflect not only the high level of inflation in many countries but also tradeoff between expanded employment and lower average pay, and the proliferation of non-wage benefits to mitigate the fall in real pay;

(4) Wage compression, meaning low ratios between the highest and lowest civil servant salaries making it difficult to attract and retain qualified staff.

These reforms were the reaffirmation to the issue of the modernization in public service experienced by the Western countries, especially in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.[3.] The following factors helped to push this modernization: Firstly, it is the economic and financial pressures facing the government of such countries in the last quarter of the twentieth century and the early years of the 21st century. These pressures led government to question the benefits of traditional large-scale public bureaucracies and reinforced demands for greater efficiency and value of money in the operations of civil services. Governments have "reassessed their bureaucracies and demanded changes" (Hughes, 1998, p. 4).

Secondly, it is the public pressure on governments to deliver services that are more responsive to public. There has been a growing recognition that the consumer of public services should be at the heart of the arrangements for services delivery. Whereas the traditional public administration perspective was based on the idea that public sector management was different from business management, there is now a view that public administration "has everything to learn from the private sector" (Gunn, 1998, p. 21). There is a belief that "better management" can solve a range of economic and social problems faced by governments (Pollitt, 1993, p. 1) and that management techniques from the private sector should be imported into the civil service and other parts of the public service.

Thirdly, it is the growing awareness of the potential of information technology in helping to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public service operations (see OECD, 1990, p. 14). Technological developments have transformed the processes of public administration. The development of information technology in the delivery of public services is one of the four administrative "megatrends" linked with the emergence of the so-called New Public Management or well known as the *NPM* (Hood, 1991, p. 3).

Lastly, the desire to improve political control of central government bureaucracies is another important factor in helping to explain the modernization agenda. In a number of Western liberal democratic countries, the

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[2] The nation of "surplus" contains an element of subjectivity; rigorous measures of the concept have proved difficult to devise and apply. Criteria used include comparative (cross-national) ratios of the number of civil servants to the overall population, or as percentage of the country's modern sector labor force. Another measure often used is the extent to which personnel costs "crowd out" operating budget for supplies and maintenance. In trying to determine when staff are in surplus, functional reviews and staff inspections may be undertaken to identity sector—or function-specific excess through the use of ratio analysis—which applies standardized norms of, say, proportion of agricultural extension workers to farmers.

[3] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1990; 1993). "Public Management Development: Survey 1990 and Survey 1993." Paris: OECD.

higher civil service has been seen as an abstract to control by elected politicians. Concerned that permanent officials had become too powerful in the formulation of public policy, the political leaders of many Western countries have attempted "to reassert political control over the bureaucratic machine" (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000, p. 155).

The public service reform is often done with respect to social and culture aspects which are observed in countries implementing the reforms. Experiences from Thailand and Indonesia are given in the following discussions.

Thailand: Norms and Values

In Thailand, the new bureaucratic culture was introduced by King Chulalongkorn who understood the demand of his time, opening the way for administrative reforms, systematic modernization, and absolute royal control. From this time onwards, Bangkok's appointed bureaucracy was instituted, control over the Buddhist Monkhood (Sangha) established, general education introduced, and a modern communicators network built up. In the process, the corves system was abandoned and the slaves emancipated (Prizzia, 1986). However, official political culture is preoccupied with teaching morality. If everyone knows manners and behavioral conduct, the external world consisting of the wider society will be in good order. In bureaucratic manner, responsibility is specified in within six categories of duties, namely the obligations to oneself, to the family, to the school class and fellows, to the school, to the community, and to the nation-state. There are then specified in sets of six rules to follow. For example, the duties to the nation-state are: (1) to respect the law, (2) to pay taxes, (3) to assist the officials in maintaining national stability, (4) to be loyal to defending the Nation Religion-King, (5) to preserve national independence, Thai arts and culture, and (6) to let the good of the nation prevail over self-interest (Bunsong, 1991).

The Thai bureaucracy is highly institutionalized with norms that will be established and values and designated bureaucratic behaviors. Human relationships in the bureaucracy are based upon certain established patterns. Then, a bureaucrat's advancement in the system tends to depend largely on the favoritism; the art of currying flavor with one's boss has been developed over the years. When a person is promoted rather rapidly in the bureaucracy, the term normally heard is "liakeng", which literally means "good at licking", a Thai analogy to a domestic pet which learns how to please its master by licking (sucking up).[4] A generous comment would be "khao chao khao nai kent" (he knows how to smoothly approach his lord and master). Therefore, there is a general impression that the Thai bureaucratic system is plagued with personalized or patron clientelism. Even though it might not be completely true, a study of the attitude of a group of 300 public officials who underwent a training course at the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA) in 1977 supported the fact.[5] From the study, 95 percent of the respondents believed that professional advancements in the bureaucracy depend on a patron-client relationship; 82.7 percent believed that it depends on money, and 93 percent on knowledge and ability.

Aside from the self-contradictory result, because almost the same group of respondents' believed that professional advancement in the bureaucracy depends on the patron-client relationship (95 percent) and

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[4] This kind of a so-called "bureaucratic culture" is also similar to the Indonesia's Civil Services which practiced "*Asal Bapak Senang* (ABS)" means "as the boss wishes".
[5] Thinapan Nakata (1997). "Bureaucratic Corruption in Thailand: Incongruities between Legal Codes and Social Norms" (pp. 31-33). Monograph in Public Administration, School of Public Administration, NIDA, Bangkok.

knowledge and ability (93 percent), it showed that these two factors were the most important factors in explaining the professional advancement in the Thai's bureaucracy. In essence, this is a combination of favouritism and merits system. This is a wary characteristic. Favouratism should not be viewed as one-way system. It is a patron-client system of: "you scratch my back and I scratch yours",[6] which involves three levels of relationships for superiors, subordinates, and equals. As one writers puts it:

> Working in bureaucracy, you must try to gain experience, to understand human relations, and to be able to catch up with all the tricks. You cannot just depend on work efficiency but you must also use your knowledge to understand the nature of environment. That is to be able to succeed in a bureaucracy, you must be pulled by your superiors, pushed by your subordinates, and supported by your equals. (Pooyai dueng, poonoidun. Kou samaeokan sanubsanoon)[7]

Therefore, the art of gaining favor inside the bureaucratic culture is not an easy task. It involves a number of people, techniques, and sacrifices in terms of one's principle and self-respect.

Another feature of the Thai's bureaucracy is the significant role of the bureaucrats in the administration and politics. These career bureaucrats, especially those in the top echelon, have virtually monopolized political and administrative power, running the routines as well as initiating policy. Thus, the bureaucrats assume administrative as well as political power. Therefore, the feature of the bureaucracy in Thailand can also be described as a "bureaucratic polity".[8]

The concept of the bureaucratic polity referred both to a particular type of political regime and also to the influence of Thai bureaucratic culture on the mode of governance. Military rules frequently ousted elected governments in Thailand and substituted their own form of rule, coping civilian elements as they saw it. The power of bureaucrats stemmed in large part from the reliance of the military on the bureaucrats elite in order to rule effectively. Thus, the bureaucratic polity was one in which bureaucrats were permanent member of the political class. Chai-anan (1987) provided as typical analysis of Thai bureaucratic culture: The bureaucracy was hierarchical by organized in order to reflect differential status and power consideration rather than a national division of labor or chain of command; it gave priority to personnel relations of patron age and dependency, with deference and loyalty being more important than merit, and it emphasized above all else security for its members.

Thai bureaucracy was typified by corruption, facturalism, departementalism and a tendency to diffuse responsibility for making decisions so as to preserve the status and autonomy of individuals, cliques, and departments (Siffin, 1966, pp. 200-201). Purchase of office was common in the senior ranks (Ockey, 2004, pp. 148-149). "Money politics" dominated the electorial and parliamentary processes. However, the bureaucracy retained a considerable degree of control over polity as well as administration, because coalition governments were generally weak and indecisive (Bidhya, 2001).

In sum, functional nationality was not the main organizing principle of Thai bureaucratic norms and practices. Nevertheless, there were some parts of the state machinery that developed a reputation for technocratic excellence, such as the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC), and the Bank of Thailand (BOT). But

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[6] Ibid, pp. 26-36.

[7] Kroo Ha (Pseudonym), "Cha Pen Huana (To Be a Boss)" in Warasarn Rachakasn (Civil Service Journal) Vol. IX, No. 2 (B.E. 2507), pp. 21-23.

[8] The term "bureaucratic polity" was developed by Fred Riggs to describe his model for understanding the Thai political system as he found in the 19005. See Fred Riggs (1966). "Thailand: The modernization of a bureaucratic polity." Honolulu: East-West Center Press.

even these island an apparent technocrat of reforming zeal were something of a mirage[9]. The influence of political on the bureaucratic culture is still significant. "…Because top official wanted to please politicians in order to keep their position secure" (Nukul Commission Report, 1998, pp. 169-172).

Indonesia: Morality and Corruption

In countries such as Indonesia where civil servants, like politicians, are key government decision makers, government employees are sometimes viewed as community leaders. In this sense, civil servants may be expected to perform many duties in the community where they live, following practices established during the Dutch colonial era. Such role calls for adherences to norms and morality meaning that the civil servants must avoid irregularities and always obey the rules when conducting their activities (Magnis, 1996; Natakusumah, 1990). Therefore, civil servants should not engage in illegal activities, such as bribery, corruption, and other misconducts.

Friederich (1940) noted growing importance of internal values and moral and professional standards among bureaucrats. In their absence, abuse of power can easily arise in the government sector.

A study by Meier and O'Toole (2006) shows that bureaucratic values are far more important in explaining bureaucratic output and outcomes than political factors. This should be taken to mean that external political control is unimportant, but it does show that paying serious attention to the values of civil servants is important.

Ensuring that civil servants give high priority to honesty, responsibility, and integrity with regard to their routine duties can be accomplished through well-planned human resource development. Human resource development for civil servants starts with their recruitment and continues until they leave government service. Recruits should undertake job and requirement analyses before undertaking recruitment activities. Furthermore, to allow the civil service to select the best candidates, the recruitment process should be fair and open.

The next step in human resource development for civil servants is education and training. This should be provided regularly for those at every level, as is already done in the armed forces. Considering the importance of trainings, in Indonesia training and education play a major role in the effort to increase the quality of civil service. However, training and education (pendidikan dan pelatihan-diklat) aims not only at the improvement of job- and work-related skills and knowledge. Forming the attitudinal and behavioral characteristics of civil servants and ensuring their political allegiance with the programme of the government have always been an integral part of the human resources development programmes of the government.

To complement public sector reform in improving transparent and accountable governance, Indonesia implemented a series of measures designed to combat corruption during the reformation period. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) was formed in 2003, five years after the fall of the Suharto's government, to coordinate and supervise anti-corruption efforts, while focusing on eliminating and preventing corruption and conducting a system review. It undertakes this mission on the assumption that a comprehensive, systematic, and long-term approach is needed to achieve a "corruption-free Indonesia", which must by definition include the holistic participation of all stakeholders. As such, its aim is to become a driver of change in cultivating a culture of anti-corruption in Indonesian society, government, and the business world (Sunaryadi, 2007).

The KPK is independent from the executive, legislative, and judicial branches and responsible to the general public. It receives funding from the state budget and donors. Its activities include coordination,

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[9] From discussion with the faculty members of the Faculty of Economics, Thamasat University, Bangkok, Tuesday, March 25, 2008.

supervision, investigation, prosecution, prevention, and system review. In terms of staff, it has five commissioners, two advisors, and 600 staff members. These human resources face a population of over 230 million people, around four million of whom are public servants, within the many provincial and local governments.

The KPK's duties include supervision and coordination of institutions authorized to eradicate corruption; investigation, indictment, and prosecution of corrupt acts; preventive actions against corrupt acts; and monitoring state governance and prosecutions against criminal acts of corruption; implementing a reporting system for the purposes of eradicating corruption, requesting information from relevant institutions for the purposes of eradicating corruption; arranging opinion hearings and meetings with institutions authorized to eradicate corruption; and requesting for reports from relevant institutions pertaining to the prevention of criminal acts of corruption. Law No. 30 of 2002 on the Corruption Eradication Commission provided the basis for the functions, authority, and duties of the institution.

One initial challenge in the fight against corruption related to the way in which it was defined over the 1971-2004 period. Laws and regulations tended to address only those types of corruption that represented a direct loss to the state apparatus. As of 2006, a publication called "Memahami Untuk Membasmi" now identifies 30 distinct types of corruption, many of which were previously overlooked. In addition to defining two types of corruption representing a loss to the state, other major categories of corruption include 12 types of bribery, five types of embezzlement, six types of procurement fraud, and one type of procurement conflicts of interest.

The KPK also faced other challenges. Its establishment followed a long history of anti-corruption measures, most of which had focused primarily on investigation of existing cases of corruption, rather than on prevention (see Table 1). As a result of this lack of emphasis on prevention, many of the lessons learned from early efforts were not applied on an ongoing basis. Consequently, Indonesia found that the same kinds of corruption were equally prevalent over the course of decades. For example, people at similarly high level positions were arrested for comparable offences in the 1950s, 1970s, 1980s, and again in the 2000s. Similarly, the same types of procurement corruption happened in 1983 and 2003. Areas perceived as highly corrupt in the 1970s continued to give the same impressions.

Table 1

History of Key Anti-corruption Measures in Indonesia, 1957-2007

1957	Order to fight corruption (Military Commander)
1967	Presidential Decree to fight corruption through prevention and repression (Corruption Eradication Team)
1970	Presidential Decree to access corruption and its solution (Commission of Four)
1977	Presidential instruction to take disciplinary action in operations and administration (Disciplinary Team)
1987	Ministry of Finance order for a special operation on corruption in taxation (Special Re-audit on Tax Return)
1999	Asset examination and disclosure law for public officials (Public Official Wealth Examiner)
1999	Government regulations to investigate complex corruption (Corruption Eradication Joint Team)
2003	KPK established
2005-2007	Timtas Corruption Eradication Coordination (Attorney General. Police. Auditor)

Note. Source: Author's compilation from various sources.

To address this situation, the KPK has aimed to use an integrated programme implementation approach, which includes capacity development, prevention, repression of corruption, and public involvement and

participation. This entailed a shift in focus for programmes to combat corruption. The KPK placed attention on the issue of bribery, catching "big fishes", winning public trust, using court video recordings, bureaucratic reform, and integrating investigation and prevention measures. These polices have resulted in many highly publicized cases where senior officials were caught "red-handed" on videotape in the process of conducting an illegal act. At the same time, court video recording helped to increase transparency and public awareness of court procedures and decisions. Between 2007 and 2010, significant anti-corruption reforms were completed to increase legal certainty, reduce budget leakages, increase investment, and increase state revenues. The ongoing commitment to anti-corruption is expected to gradually increase citizen trust in government, while additionally improving investor confidence.

Final Remarks

Civil Service Reform as parts of the bureaucratic reform should be designed to reduce corruption. If officials are paid much less than those with similar training elsewhere in the economy, only those willing to accept bribes will be attracted to the public sector. The rest will work in private enterprises. But in spite of the low pay, positions in the state bureaucracy can be valuable assets. In some developing countries there is a lively market for bureaucratic positions that generate large bribes. Positions in corrupt police departments are likely to be especially valuable (Phongpaicit & Piriyangsaran, 1996). Civil service wages should be set equivalent to the wages of those in similar positions within the private sector so as to enable service without corruption and misconducts.

Bureaucratic reform is expensive and politically difficult, and it may seem beyond the capacity of many poor countries. Yet it cannot be avoided in any credible reform effort. Therefore, structural and administrative reforms which have been introduced in most developing countries should be directed to free the civil service from politics and the civil servants from political pressure. This is the primary reason for the merit-based civil service reforms in which entry into the service is qualification-based determined, among others, by competitive examinations and promotions to higher positions are based on performance, competence, and other merit-based standards and not on connections.

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What are Reflected by the Navigations of Zheng He and Christopher Columbus

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The contrast of the navigations of Zheng He and Christopher Columbus shows two kinds of humanistic values: harmonious altruism reflected by Chinese culture and aggressive egocentrism revealed by the Western culture and their different effects on the world. This article explores the reasons for their different actions, trying to demonstrate that Western humanistic education is problematic.

Keywords: Western culture, Chinese culture, humanism, values

Introduction

There were a lot of articles and books discussing about Zheng He and Christopher Columbus separately. Columbus's studies paid more attention to Columbus's voyages and their impact to local people. *The Tainos: Rise & Decline of the People Who Greeted Columbus* edited by Irving Rouse (1992) was a temperate and balanced description. Samuel M. Wilson (1990) illustrated the character and destruction of Taino culture in *Hispaniola: Caribbean Chiefdoms in the Age of Columbus*. The effect of the first encounters on the native populations was given by James Axtell (1992) in *Beyond 1492: Encounters in Colonial North America*. The debate over Columbus's achievements was presented in *Secret Judgments of God: Old World Disease in Colonial Spanish America* edited by Noble David Cook and W. George Lovell (1991) on the disastrous effects on the native peoples. An anti-European treatment was shown in Ray González's (1992) *Without Discovery: A Native Response to Columbus* (Flint, 2014). As to Zheng He studies, before the turn of the 21st century, in English little attention has been paid to the life and travels of Zheng He, except Louise Levathes's (1994) work *When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405-1433*. The 600th anniversary of his voyages prompted several studies, including *Seven Epic Voyages of Zheng He in Ming China, 1405-1433* edited by Ming-yang Su (2005) and *Peace Missions on a Grand Scale: Admiral Zheng He's Seven Expeditions to the Western Oceans* edited by Fang Zhongfu and Li Erhe (2005) (Lo, 2014).

In China, Liang Qichao (1985) initiated Zheng He studies by publishing "The biography of a great sailor of our country" in *Xin Min Newspaper Series* in 1904. Shi Ping (2003) divided Zheng He studies into five phases in "Zheng He studies in one century" and he also discussed "The extension and innovation of Zheng He's cultural value" (Shi, 2008). There were three articles contrasting the different goals and impacts of the sailings of Zheng He and Christopher Columbus to the local people, such as "The contrast of the goals of the navigations of Zheng He and Christopher Columbus" (Liu, 2008). Liu unanimously illustrated that Zheng He

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peacefully traded with the local people and Christopher Columbus did harm to the natives.

This article will contrast different humanistic values reflected by the two events and try to demonstrate that Western humanistic education is problematic.

The Two Navigations and Their Effects on the World

Ordered by the Emperor Zhu Li of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 CE), Admiral Zheng He led a group of more than 27,000 people in 200 ships people and countries west of China, including more than 30 countries in the Middle East was Mecca in Saudi Arabia, the farthest place they arrived in Africa was the seaport of Beira in Mozambique. They went to these places seven times in 28 years during the years 1405-1433. They took with them for trading silk, porcelain, rice, tea, the compass, the technologies of agriculture, medicine, paper-making, and printing. According to the record of *Taizong Shilu* (the entry on 11 July 1405) about the dispatch of the fleet, Admiral Zheng He and others departed for the first expedition, bearing imperial letters to the countries of the Western Ocean and with gifts to their kings of gold brocade, patterned silks, and colored silk gauze, according to their status (Dreyer, 2007). After the return of their fourth voyage, rulers of 18 countries sent envoys bringing tribute to the Ming court (Chan, 1988). All together Admiral Zheng He and his fleet brought back to China about 180 kinds of tribute goods, such as silver, spices, sandalwood, precious stones, ivory, ebony, camphor, tin, deer hides, coral, kingfisher feathers, tortoise shells, gums and resin, rhinoceros horn, sapanwood and safflower (for dyes and drugs), Indian cotton cloth, and ambergris (for perfume). They even brought back exotic animals, such as ostriches, elephants, and giraffes. It is said that the treasure voyages helped the flourishing of the Ming economy (Finlay, 2008).

They peacefully and harmoniously traded with the local people, doing nothing harmful to these areas. Even though Admiral Zheng He and his fleet sailed through the South Asian and Indian oceans with a defensive force larger and stronger than any local power, they did not intend colonial conquests, but did help fight pirates. As Dreyer (2007, p. 31 & 79) said, "The fleet engaged and defeated Chen Zuyi's pirate fleet in Palembang (Indonesia), Alakeshvara's forces in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and Sekandar's (Indonesia) forces in Semudera (Indonesia)", which "served as a reminder of the tremendous power of Ming China to the countries along the maritime routes". Yet, as Dreyer (2007, p. 65) said, "There is no written evidence in historical sources that there was any attempt that they forcibly tried to control the maritime trade (rather than through exploration and promotion of trade) in the regions of the South China Sea or the Indian Ocean". A documentary shows the archaeological excavation process (Hubei province, China) of the tomb of the youngest brother of two Emperors in the Ming Dynasty. In the tomb, they found two golden coins made of gold given by the Emperor, on which the Chinese characters clearly recorded that these were made of the golden materials purchased in the western ocean, which connected it only with Zheng He's voyage. Later research showed that the coins were made after Zheng He's fifth voyage (see Figure 1 and http://www.hbww.org/Views/Detail.aspx?PNo=Exhibiti on&No=CSZ L&Guid=6295ae72).

Figure 1. The photo of the coin and its illustration.

The text carved on one side of the coin (the left) says, The coin was made of the golden materials (eight karats) purchased in the Western ocean areas in April of Yongle 17 (April, 1420), weighing 50 liang (50.2355 oz) each. On another side of the coin (the right) shows the year (August, Yongle 14/August 1417) in which the golden materials was purchased, the quality of the golden materials (eight karats), and the name of two makers.

So, the voyages were diplomatic and commercial in nature but not a "military exercise" (Finlay, 2008, p. 330), which clearly shows that the voyages were conducted in accordance to Confucian ideals (Lee, 2010). How many people in the world know this?

But it is a common idea that, in search of China, Christopher Columbus "discovered" the American continent (1492-1502) using China's invention of the "compass" 87 years later. Many Americans and Europeans are taught that Columbus's voyages represent a good action of "discovery" and "progress" of the European civilization stretching to the "uncivilized" continent. But Bryan Strong strongly disagrees, arguing instead that, "For others throughout the world, his legacy is colonialism, slavery and the destruction of people and cultures". Published in *The New York Times* on November 4, 1989, he wrote:

> Two days after he "discovered" America, Columbus wrote in his journal that with 50 men he could force "the entire population be taken to Castile, or held captive". On his second voyage, in December, 1494, Columbus captured 1,500 Tainos on the island of Hispaniola and herded them to Isabela, where 550 of "the best males and females". were forced aboard ships bound for the slave markets of Seville.
>
> Under Columbus's leadership, the Spanish attacked the Taino, sparing neither men, women nor children. Warfare, forced labor, starvation and disease reduced Hispaniola's Taino population (estimated at one million to two million in 1492) to extinction within 30 years.
>
> Until the European discovery of America, there was only a relatively small slave trade between Africa and Europe. Needing labor to replace the rapidly declining Taino, the Spanish introduced African slaves to Hispaniola in 1502. By 1510, the trade was important to the Caribbean economy. (p. 24)

The author agrees with Strong. Since then, forceful Western imperialism began to segment and colonialize the whole world, China has not escaped from this disaster.

The contrast of the two events shows two kinds of humanistic values: aggressive egocentrism revealed by the Western culture and harmonious altruism reflected by Chinese culture. They contrast their different effects on the world, which suggests the failure of Western shallow humanistic education and the success of Chinese deeper humanistic education.

We will explore this problem through the different understandings of the relationship between the religious and humanistic values in Western and Chinese culture. These contrasting relationships between the value claims of religion and humanism reflect varied understanding of the universe, of the relationship between

human beings and the universe, and the attitude taken toward other people on earth, leading to the foreign policy that one country takes toward another country, harmonious or domineering.

Material World Oriented Education in Western Culture

It is well known that Western humanistic culture is based on ancient Greek-Roman culture. The importance of Plato is expressed by Alfred North Whitehead (1979), a modern British philosopher, who said, "The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato". The core of Platonic thoughts lies in Plato's doctrine of essences, ideas, or forms. According to Plato, ultimate reality, which he calls the one is spiritual and this spiritual realm consists of "ideal" forms or absolutes (e.g., justice) that exist, whether or not any mind posits their existence or reflects their attributes. It is this form that shapes our physical world and this physical world is just an imitation of the absolute forms of the spiritual realm. For example, the perfect sphere exists as an ideal form and earthly spheres are approximations of it.

Here, we can draw some conclusions: Firstly, the universe consists of two separated worlds: one is spiritual and the other physical. Secondly, the spiritual one comes first, the physical one second, and everything, even any concept in the physical world, is a replica of the original pattern of essences, such as logic in the spiritual world. Plato's dichotomy became Western culture's main thinking pattern, which is very dangerous because of its binary oppositions. A tricky point we should pay attention to is that, although Plato focused on the heavenly world as a guide for humans to become better, he is not regarded as a humanist by the Western culture. He seemed very spiritual because he tried his best to elaborate the spiritual realm, yet he devoted most of his life to teaching people how to construct an "ideal country" in his "the republic," how to manage "the republic" in "the laws", and how to educate people to maintain "the republic" which seemed very materialistic. Western people's attitude toward him and his own thoughts and actions show the contradictions under the dichotomic way of thinking, which serves a good example of words in one way, actions in another from the beginning of the Western culture.

Aristotle's humanism led to the study of the material-oriented world, resulting in the quick and profound development in every branch of human civilization technically since then, and technology brings the Western people confidence. Western technologies, such as "gunboat imperialism" gave them confidence to believe that that they should "educate" other "savage" human beings in their eyes and get profits from them, because they think wrongly that they are superior in every aspect to other nations.

This is especially a problem in the modern Western scientific world lack of the deep, spiritual study of the universe taught by Plato and religions. They know deeply the physical aspect of the universe, such as the exploration and the utilization of the energy of the sun, the stars, etc. But Western scientific techniques deny and suppress understanding the spiritual aspect of the universe fully and thoroughly, let alone its inhabitants' proper relationships. That is why they cannot find harmony between the religious values and humanistic values in their practical life. Though this is also true to some of the Chinese nowadays, it was not true for the ancient Chinese.

The Contradiction Between Humanistic Values and Religious Values in Western Culture

According to Howard L. Parsons (2014),

> For the most part humanists in Western Christian cultures have assumed certain, though not all, values assumed in Christianity. They have defined their positions either by a redefinition and reapplication of certain Christian values or by an absolute repudiation of those values.

To Brian Edgar (2014), Director of Theology and Public policy for the Evangelical Alliance, there are eight core Christian values:

(1) Grace—a subversive value! Giving people more than they deserve;

(2) Hope—not a guarantee of immunity from harm but a conviction that God is always present;

(3) Faith—the means to real depth in relationships of all kinds;

(4) Love—means to love the unlovely;

(5) Justice—for all (not "just-me"). A concept biased in favor of the disadvantaged;

(6) Joy—impossible to legislate for this but an essential social value;

(7) Service—meaning is found in service rather than self-centeredness;

(8) Peace—not just the absence of fighting but positive well-being.

For most of the time in human history, the majority of the Western people have defined their positions as Howard L. Parsons said, "by a redefinition and reapplication of certain Christian values", which suggests that most Western people are educated in Christian values. Those who are theist can accept the Christian religious values easily, but what kind of value education is supplied to those who do not believe in God? Obviously, Western humanism came into being to play the role increasingly when modern science weakened Christianity's influence. But while Christian on the surface, colonialists such as Christopher Columbus absolutely repudiated the eight fundamental social values in their crude, violent pursuit of slaves and gold, porcelain and silk. This aroused people's questions about the validity of the Western humanistic value education because Christopher Columbus lived in the era of the beginning of the modern era, the European Renaissance (14th-17th centuries), characterized by humanism, began in Florence, Italy, his motherland in the 14th century (Burke, 1998). There is no doubt that he was baptized Christopher: the Christ-bearer who assumed himself "the messenger of the Holy Spirit to those who sat in darkness", carrying Christian light to the west, he had taken the mission of dove (Hale, 2014) all these reveals the contradiction between religious values and Western humanistic values in Christopher Columbus.

Given an excuse that Christopher Columbus (1451-1506) was an exception, then let us read some stanzas of the poem "Man" by George Herbert (1593-1633), a Welsh born English poet, orator and Anglican priest,

> …
> For us, the winds, do blow,
> The earth doth rest, heaven move, and fountains flow;
> Nothing we see, but means our good,
> As our delight, or as our treasure;
> The whole is either our cupboard of food,
> Or cabinet of pleasure.
> …
> All things unto our flesh are kind,
> …
> More servants wait on man
> Than he will take notice of. In every path,
> He treads down that which doth befriend him
> When sickness makes him pale and wan.

> Oh mighty love! Man is one world, and hath
> Another to attend him.

This poem is the embodiment of Western humanism. It eulogizes man's beauty, man's power, and man's central position in the universe, But Western humanism takes no notice of those who "attend him" and even regards them as "servants" who are inferior to them, and "in every path, he treads down that which doth befriend him when sickness makes him pale and wan". This shows their strong anthropocentric view and their opposition against nature and universe, indicating that there is no real humanity and equality advocated by them, even if there exist, they have been narrowed down to the realm of human beings, excluding these they define as the heathens, therefore, humanistic humanity and equality are limited and narrow-minded. The author does not know why Charles Cotton, an English poet and writer, described Herbert as a soul composed of harmonies, but she does agree with Herbert himself that in a letter to Nicholas Ferrar, said of his writings, "They are a picture of spiritual conflicts between God and my soul before I could subject my will to Jesus, my Master" (Herbert, 2014).

From the above, we know the contradiction between the religious values and humanistic values has expanded into modern culture's problems, among all kinds of people, from common people like Christopher Columbus, to scholars like Charles Cotton, even priests and parliament members like George Herbert. That is why there are always conflicts between what the Western humanism advocates and the actions they take in some events. They always try every means to do something only for the benefit of themselves, not caring about others, and if the others do not obey, they will resort to force, eventually there is no good even for themselves, and this still violently influences modern international world affairs, the situation in Libya is the result of this liberal interventionism.

The Reasons for the Contradiction

But, academically, little attention has been paid to the disparity between what the Western humanism's advocates and the actions they take in some events. The self-interested actions are always regarded as special or particular cases, or even regarded as their rights, their freedom. Responsibilities are usually shifted to the government by some individuals. But seldom has it been realized that this is the failure of the whole Western humanistic education.

The American humanist Fred Edwards (2014) counts eight different branches of western humanism: literary humanism, Renaissance humanism, Western cultural humanism, philosophical humanism, Christian humanism, secular humanism, religious humanism, and modern humanism (also called naturalistic humanism), scientific humanism, ethical humanism, and democratic humanism. From the names of the eight branches, it seems that they give a thorough exploration of humanism from every aspect. Furthermore, there must have been some philosophers in each branch exploring the relationship between religious values and humanistic values in the western history. In my point of view, they all failed, though their discussion helped to bring about a lot of new subjects to be studied deeply, making the modern western human science far more advanced than the Eastern countries.

The first reason of the humanism's failure is that these varieties did not clarify the definition of "human being." They took it for granted that when a person is born, the person is a human, so everything the person does to satisfy his own needs is reasonable, representing his individuality, his rights, and his freedom. But this encourages the individual's selfishness and self-centeredness, thus making Western humanism becomes extremely vulgar.

The second problem is that the distinction between religious values and humanistic values has been blurred, just as Howard L. Parsons (2014, p. 5) pointed out, "Whereas the rationalist humanist takes such social values of the Judaic-Christian tradition as love, compassion, fraternity, and mutual aid to be basic, the empirical humanist tends to subordinate these values in favor of individuality, liberty, and equality of rights and opportunities". Therefore, they set the same moral standard for the religious and secular people, and the worst of all, they do not tell people how to achieve that spiritually. From the above eight core Christian values, we can see they are very demanding, not every one can abide by, only those people who endeavor to become a "saint", "God", or "Bodhisattva" spiritually have the potential to practice them, let alone to achieve these standards.

The third reason is that religious values have gradually lost their influence over the common people. As we know, from Renaissance to Enlightenment, People's positions have been largely improved, while God's position has been lowered, and gradually "died." Since Nietzsche announced that God was dead, more and more people do not believe in God and pay more attention to human and the material values, such as wealth. The principle that people make laws for themselves and science discovered laws of nature in the 19th century indicate the Western wish for superiority to nature. Therefore, religious culture has lost its dominant place, while secular culture has become more and more prosperous. Hence Western civilization surpassed China in natural science and some aspects of social science in the recent 300 years. But excessive emphasis on secular culture leads to the ignorance of religious culture, producing a lot of social problems. For example, spiritual crisis caused by the belief crisis has allowed the destruction of the environment, dehumanization, etc. happened earlier in the Western countries, now happened also in China.

The fourth but the most important reason is that Westerners have not realized that the religious values represent divinity and humanism represents humanity. The two should be united together to make a holy human being, but Western culture makes them go in opposite directions, hence the split and fragmentation of the modern Western people. That is why some people from Western culture advocate democracy, equality, and fraternity on one hand, but separate, damage, and even invade other countries and kill their people for their own benefits, on the other hand. The most dangerous of all, many of them do not think this liberal interventionism is wrong and they are regarded as typical Western culture in the eyes of Eastern culture, especially the Chinese people's eyes.

The contradiction between what they claim and what they do proves the Western humanistic education to be problematic.

Spiritual World Oriented Education in Chinese Culture

Before Sakyamuni's Buddhism coming into China and taking some elements of Confucianism and Daoism and at last becoming the widely accepted Mahayana Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism were the main culture in ancient China. Although Confucianism taught social harmony and Daoism mystical insight, they shared the same point of view about the universe: the unification of the universe and human beings. The real equality among the members of the universe has been added to Chinese culture by Buddhism. The three together later came to constitute Chinese traditional culture, which advocates harmony among the individual members, the country and the world; they only slightly differ in how much energy they devote to the practice of spiritual exploration.

That is why since ancient time, Chinese did not encourage competition and technology which brought present disasters to the world, especially they regarded weapons as bad, they just fight for defense and teach the other country a lesson in order to keep harmony, such as China's Defensive War against India in 1962, the Defensive War against Vietnam in 1979, though the Chinese military occupied many places, they finally withdrew from both disputed areas without additional conditions. At present, most Western people think that China has invaded Tibet in 1959, few people know that Tibet has become a part of China since 1247 and in 1288 the central government of Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) changed the name of Xuan Zheng Palace where to meet Tibetan officials into Xuan Zheng Yuan, an institute directly managing Tibetan Buddhist and military affairs, such as sending military troops to stay in Tibet and protect the frontier, food and properties of the troops and common people, etc. (The biography of Sang Ge in *The History of Yuan Dynasty*, Vol. 205), which explains why PLA were sent to Tibet in 1959 to liberate the slaves of the upper class peacefully according to the negotiation, unfortunately they had been resisted by some landlords who hid into the temples which led to the destruction of the temples and death of the monks. If China had an invasive culture, with Zheng He's high technology of sailing in the Ming Dynasty, they could have gone everywhere to colonialize that place, then the country named "the sun never set" would be China not Great Britain without doubt. So, Zheng He's sailing is a sound proof of China's peaceful development.

So, those who regard China as a threat do not understand Chinese culture at all, Chinese foreign policy of *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence* (mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence) in the modern times is the embodiment of Chinese traditional culture.

The Consistency Between the Religious and Humanistic Values.

As we know Chinese people have been influenced by Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism since ancient times. Few people know the real essence of the three, which have been regarded as "three religions" by the Western scholars and some contemporary scholars in China. Actually, only Buddhism has been regarded as religion in China since the very beginning. Part of Daoism became religion in the process of its rivalry with Buddhism for the influence over the country. Part of Daoism still exists together with Confucianism, and Confucianism has rarely been taken as a religion, which has usually been regarded as the teaching of becoming a "real human being". So, in the academic field of Chinese history, the three have always been discussed as "the unification of three teachings", because in Chinese, "religion" and "teaching" share one word "jiao," so many people get confused. In modern language, we can say that Buddhism and Daoism aim to educate those people who have religious beliefs and pursue spiritual happiness, while Confucianism aims to educate those people who do not have religious beliefs and pursue worldly happiness.

But different from Western humanism, even though Confucianists guide people concerning how to pursue worldly happiness and success, they emphasize individual personality perfectness. Therefore, Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism are congruent in improving people's spiritual world, especially, the humanistic qualities. For example, the first sentence of *Daxue* (《大学》/*Great Knowledge* for those who want to become great man), one of the famous Confucian works, illustrates three basic principles to get great knowledge (not just academic knowledge, but the knowledge covering every aspect of life): the first is to understand and pursue great virtue and make yourself accepted and praised by others because of your good virtue. The second is to love others and the third is to get to the perfect. We know the state of the perfect is what Daoism calls "real human being",

what Buddhism calls "Buddha". So, we can see there is little disparity between the religious and humanistic values in China, though the humanistic values come from different educational systems.

Then, what is the definition of "real human being" in China? A "real human being" himself/herself should be enlightened as a saint and have the ability to enlighten others, and at least do everything to benefit oneself and at the same time benefit others in the win-win sense. Otherwise, a selfish and self-centered person will be looked down upon and called a "non-human being" or an "animal with a human skin" which is the most shameful thing in the world in the Chinese point of view. This idea is enlarged to a country's image, that is why China has been insisting on co-operation and mutual benefit and advocating win-win policy in the international affairs, never approving of solving dispute by wars except defense, because Chinese does not want China to be regarded as a country without humanity.

In Chinese, the word "humanism" comes from a Confucian book *Yi Zhuan* (《易传》/*The Explanation of the Book of Changes*). It says, "Yin yang jiao cuo, tian wen ye; wen ming yi zhi, ren wen ye. guan hu tian wen, yi ca shi bian, guan hu ren wen, yi hua cheng tian xia" (*ben gua·tuan zhuan*). It can be translated as the following,

> The weaving of Yin and Yang is the civilization of heaven, the arriving of humanism is the civilization of people. Observe the civilization of heaven in order to observe the changing of worldly situations. Observe the civilization of people, changes are found to consist of the world.

From these sentences, we can see that ancient Chinese have realized the relationship between the heaven and human beings, and the mutual influences of what happens in heaven and among human beings. In China, heaven usually refers to the realm of spirits, who lives in the universe, here we can see spirits are for the people, so the relationship between people and nature is harmonious. This may sound rather religious to the people of scientific culture like the West, who usually hold a dichotomy attitude to everything though they know in mind that everything is interacted, when facing specific things they tend to divide everything into two parts without notice. Take *Yin-Yang Diagram* as an example, there is a white eye in a black fish, and a black eye in a white fish, the colors are changeable even in a same fish, the distinction between the white fish and the black fish is to see which color is the main color of the fish at certain moment. This helps to explain how Chinese understand the relationship between the heaven and human beings, and the mutual influences of what happens in heaven and among human beings.

China's living philosophy regards the whole universe as a living totality. Human beings are only a part of it, though a very precious part. All members of the universe, including the plants, animals, insects, human beings, spirits, etc., have differences, but are ultimately equal. If human beings treat other members of the universe unfairly, they will be punished, this punishment is shown as serious natural disasters, fatal illnesses, such as Tsunamis, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, etc. So, all nations must stop our air and water pollution dangers, for example.

In the Chinese worldview, such problems are actually the rebellions of other members in the universe, who are usually called spirits by people, but their roles are not only to punish the wrongs, but also to produce everything, that is why Confucius sighed with deep emotion in the book *Zhong Yong* (《中庸》/*Golden Mean*):

> How great virtues spirits have! Trying to see, you will see nothing, trying to hear, you will hear nothing; nourish everything and nothing will be left out…though they themselves are invisible, their achievements are obvious, which indeed cannot be concealed.

Here, we can see that Confucius revered spirits very much. But many Confucian scholars, both in China and out of China, maintain that Confucius himself did not believe in spirits, the proof they often cited is the last half of one sentence, "Respect spirits and be far away from them (jing gui shen er yuan zhi)". What Confucius actually meant is that people should respect spirits, and do not annoy them and cause troubles. This can be seen from his answers to one of his students when asking about how to deal with ghosts, he answered "you even do not know how to deal with people, how do you know how to deal with ghosts?"(wei neng shi ren, yan neng shi gui?) When asking about death, he answered, "you do not even have enough knowledge about life, so how do you know the knowledge of the dead?" (wei zhi sheng, yan zhi si? from lun yu xian jin). That is why China's philosophy has always held the thought of the unification of heaven, the earth, and human beings.

Though "human beings are the souls of everything" (ren zhe wan wu zhi ling from li ji) and "human beings are most precious among all things in the universe" (tian di zhi xing ren wei gui" from xiao jing), it does not mean that Confucians consider human beings to be the masters of the universe who can absolutely neglect other creatures' existence. Instead, Confucians teach that human beings and the universe must be united. Human beings are the production of nature and at the same time the subject of nature. Originally speaking, nature is the source of human beings' life and value, so nature is the master of human beings on one hand, but speaking from the perspective of realization of life, human beings make nature's potential values be realized, so human beings are the masters of nature on the other hand. Here we can see nature is equal to human beings. But in the Western countries, human beings are the masters and law-makers of nature, which has no life, no internal values, only has external values that are beneficial to human beings. So, nature is seriously plundered and damaged, energy is madly dug, animals are cruelly killed during its early process of development, as we can see this from George Herman's poem (He treads down that which doth befriend him).

George Herman's eulogy to "Man" actually is shared by Chinese Humanism. Yet, the differences lie in that their different attitudes toward those "servants", such as "herbs", "fountains", "winds", in Herman's poem who "attend" humanity. As for Chinese Humanism, they respect those who "attend" humans extremely, hold rites to thank them to express their awe and gratitude. And when they are ill, they will think about what wrong they have done, because they know human's wrong doings will arouse nature's punishments with natural disasters, or disease. Hence, Chinese humanism insists on the unification of heaven, the earth, and human beings. Heaven refers to Xuling (spirits in space), the earth refers to all that grows on the earth except human beings, such as insects, plants, and animals. Chinese humanism extends human love to the whole universe, which is the expression of real humanity and equality, because they have accepted Buddhism's view that all creatures are equal (Wang, 2009). From this, we can see that Chinese humanism is more humane, more equal, and more open-minded than Western humanism.

From the above explanation of the unified relationship among the universe, human beings, and the earth, we can see China's harmony between the religious and humanistic values and their performance in reality.

The Eight Processes to Get to the Perfect

We are not going to talk here about the ways to improve one's spirituality to become a Buddha in Buddhism or a real human being in Confucianism and Daoism, because they are too complicated and too far away from the secular life. We will only talk about the Chinese Humanist methodology to get to the perfect.

In the Confucian book *Daxue* (《大学》/*Great knowledge* for those who want to become a great man), there are eight processes clearly demonstrated to teach people the ways to get to the perfect, namely how to become a

person: internally a saint and externally a ruler. They are logically in sequential order: get rid of various greedy desires → get wisdom → put one's intention in a right place → make one's attitude sincere → cultivate oneself → manage one's family and tribe properly → govern the country → balance the world. It says:

> In ancient times, one who wanted to make their great virtue known to the public must govern his country properly first. One who wanted to govern his country properly, must manage his family and tribe properly first. Those who wanted to manage his family and tribe properly, must cultivate himself first; those who wanted to cultivate himself, must put his intention in a right place first; those who wanted to put his intention in a right place, must make his attitude sincere first; those who wanted to make his attitude sincere, must get wisdom first; those who wanted to get wisdom, must get rid of various greedy desires first.

Among the eight procedures, "cultivate oneself" plays the key role, which combines the former four and the latter three procedures, the former four prepare the requirements for the cultivation of oneself, and the latter three provide the positions for the cultivated one to display his ability.

About the last sentence in the quoted paragraph, there is a wrong explanation in Chinese held by many experts both in China and out of China for a long time. The initiator was Zhu Xi, the forefather of Idealist Confucianism in Song Dynasty. Zhu Xi explained it as, "The way to get knowledge is to make an endless study of everything" (yan yu zhi wu zhi zhi, zai ji wu er qiong qi li ye). Of course, people can never get an endless study of anything, and if it means just common knowledge, it would not meet the requirements to train a person internally to be a saint and externally a ruler. Actually, it means that people should reduce their excessive desires for materials, money, honor, etc. in order to obtain the state of peace and calmness, and then can wisdom appear. This explanation is in accordance with the latter passage in *Daxue*, "When you know where to reach you can become steady, being steady makes one become quiet, being quiet makes one peaceful, being peaceful makes one able to think, to think makes one gain wisdom" (zhi zhi er hou you ding, ding er hou neng jing, jing er hou neng an, an er hou neng lv, lv er hou neng de).

We can see that Zhu Xi confused wisdom with knowledge which can be got through study. While wisdom, which Plato called reason (logos), the author thinks, is intuition in philosophy. In Buddhism, wisdom is called the "emergence" of one's self-Buddha, and can only be got by internally, meditatively becoming steady and free of desire. Many people suspect the correctness of intuition, yet regard logical reasoning as the most advanced thinking patterns. But actually, compared with intuition, logical reasoning is lower and indirect, because intuition (free of desire) get the correct results directly from the mind without the process of reasoning and reasoning propositions. Wisdom cannot be got easily, since only those people who are not greedy for money, honor, and wealth, etc. can have a peaceful mind which, just like a mirror, reflects what comes to the mind without distortion. These people are only a few, while most people rarely get intuition, and even if they do get intuition that is proven by facts, they regard them as coincidences. So the discussed sentence should be understood as "one should get rid of various greedy desires first in order to get wisdom". This teaching coincides with Buddhism's teaching of "principles makes people steady, which produces wisdom" ("she xin wei jie, yin jie sheng ding, yin ding fa hui" from *da fo ding shou leng yan jing* 《大佛顶首楞严经》, Vol. 6).

The eight-step process teaches people how to reach to the perfect and it has been practiced not only by great people, but also by the common people, so we can see Chinese culture is a self-reflective culture. It pays more attention to the cultivation of individual's personality perfectness, and this education brings peace and harmony not only to the individual, but also to the society and the whole world.

Conclusion

Because China's independent state was broken by the Western imported opium and gunboat imperialism since the middle of the 19th century, and this plunder left many countrymen killed. Hence, some intellectuals began to doubt the Chinese spiritual-world oriented educational system and its neglect of practical technology. Then, more Chinese advocated the Western material-world-oriented educational system, especially after the policy of opening China to the world. So, now Western culture has been partly introduced and partly fully accepted by young people and people have become more and more selfish and greedy and irresponsible under the education of pursing for individuality and freedom and equality. Therefore, a lot of social diseases that happened earlier in the Western countries during their high development have now happened in China again, such as the plundering of the nature, the destruction of the environment, so many criminals and corruptions, no safety in food and life, etc. This would be impossible if under the influence of purely Chinese culture, that's why some Chinese began to advocate the education of Chinese traditional culture in modern times to correct the tendency of materialistically-dominated pursuit.

Since it is a globalization time, the contacts and conflicts between countries are becoming more and more frequent, so we should know the characteristics of different cultures in order to have a better understanding and communication to solve disputes peacefully, but always remember what Confucius said, "Do not impose on others what you yourself do not want" which is shared by Immanuel Kant's "Golden Rule".

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The Anti-corruption Fights: Perescoping the Whistle Blower Policy in Nigeria*

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The 2015 elections and swearing of new leadership in Nigeria brought about new promises as well as new policies and strategies. The president elect, Muhammadu Buhari, was quick to indicate his intentions to fight corruption as one of the means through which the government intends to achieve good governance in Nigeria. This intention and follow-up action is like the biblical two-edged sword, cutting off sadness from the lower class while at the same time cutting off happiness from some corrupt people in government. The recent announcement of the whistle blower policy by the Federal Government as another means of fighting corruption in Nigeria brought about an increase in the discovery of hidden/looted money. Relying on primary and secondary findings, based on qualitative and quantitative data the paper examines the potency of the whistle blower policy on corruption. The puzzle: is the policy yielding positive result? The case provides a strong case to the methodological analysis for both institutional norms to fight corruption and good governance in Nigeria. The thrust of this paper is that, the fight against corruption is a national issue that can be successfully tackled by the citizens. The paper therefore recommends that government and its citizenry come together to fight this malice called corruption.

Keywords: corruption, whistle blower, policy and good governance

Introduction

There exists a huge gap between the wealthy and the poor in Nigeria. This gap is due to corruption. The anti-corruption fight is to remove economic distortions in order to close the gap of inequality as well as encourage development.

Economic development depends upon good policies and effective institutions to carry out these policies. The present government must have realized that in order to transform the country, institutional transformation as well as meet the aspirations of the people, especially the poor and vulnerably cannot be met without reducing if not eradicate completely the entrenched culture of corruption and impunity in the system. The paper looks at the confluence provided by the priority set by Nigeria's government to fight corruption and eliminate waste in the management of public resources and the strategies put in place.

The announcement of the whistle blower policy by the minister of finance was not just a welcome idea but a *rewarding one*. However, one cannot help to wonder the reasons behind the much achieved success so far. Is it that the anti-corruption fever has overtaken over the people? Or is it because of the reward attached to the

policy? Against these backdrops, starting from the introduction this paper is sub-divided into four sections. Section two deals with conceptual underpinning. This gives us an overview on the concept of corruption. Section three highlights the consequences of corruption to the nation, institutions, and citizens. Section four deals with reform proposal which gives an insight into the strategies and policies put in place so far to fight corruption in Nigeria as well as give some recommendations.

Conceptual Underpinning

Corruption occurs where private wealth and public power overlap. Several scholars have come up with so many definitions of corruption. Ndubisi (1986), views corruption as any act by a public official which violates the accepted standards of behavior in order to serve private or public ends. It was also said to be the use of legislated power by government officials for illegitimate private gain, which leads not only to this misallocation of resources, but also affects the manner in which decisions are made (Osewe, 2012). Ackerman (2014) considered Treisman, 2007 definition as an umbrella definition quoted thus "The abuse of public power for private gain" (p. 299). Defiem (1995) defines corruption as "the side stepping of legally prescribed procedures, which regulates social action" (p. 8). These include covert behavior seen as unacceptable, various forms of embezzling public funds such as direct stealing, inflating of purchase figures or a police officer extorting bribes in the street as well as alteration and forging of documents.

There is no official or universally accepted definition of corruption. Corruption is considered as a criminal offence. The laws of Nigeria prescribe that persons accused of corrupt practices should be arraigned and prosecuted in the courts of law and if convicted, be subjected to befitting punishment (Asobie, 2012). The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides that the "state shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power" (section 15:5). Also in the (third schedule, part 1) corruption is criminalized by making it a punishable offence. Although nowhere in the constitution is the world "corruption" or "corrupt practice" specifically defined, what is captured or stated in the constitution is "gratification" and the reader is merely informed that corruption "includes bribery, fraud and other related offences" (Corrupt practices Act, 2000). However so many public officers have been peremptorily removed from office and some forced to resign from their esteemed office on account of charge of corruption. Many types of corruption and the rate of corruption are highly correlated to the extent that countries are classified as either less or more corrupt. Is poverty a cause of corruption or poverty a consequence of corruption?

Consequences of Corruption

Among close watchers and analysts of the development process in Nigeria, there is agreement that corruption is prevalent in the country and remains the major albatross on her path to growth. The consequences of corruption is said to be visible in all sectors of the economy and social sphere. These can be seen as being demonstrated by decayed infrastructure, corrupt tendencies in all the arms of government and security agencies, fraudulent practices by public office holders, the smeared international image and blurred prospects of corruption that must diminish in the near future for accelerated development to occur (Mohammed, Aluaigba, & Kabir, 2012).

Poverty and Inequality

Looking at every sector of the society, the world at large, signs of poverty and inequality is glaring. In order to examine inequality and poverty, it is necessary to bring to notice a few methodological difficulties. The

most common measure of poverty is household consumption or expenditure. An absolute poverty line represents the cost of some necessities, including food and other needs, such as housing, clothing, education, and health care. Rakodi (2002), Satterwaite (2004), and UN-Habibat (2006), do agree on the points that money-metric measures of poverty have limitations, which most times adversely affect comparisons of the incidence of poverty most especially in the areas of prices and patterns of consumption between the wealthy and the poor.

Access to wealth depends on the resources available to and constraints on particular households: education and skills, dependency ratios, health status, relative location of affordable residential areas and employment centres and access to public transport. The rich live well, while those who are not rich, live a life of struggle marked by poverty, ill-health and insecurity. That is to say there is an exclusion of a large proportion of residents from wealth, opportunities, and good living conditions (Varshney, 1993; Jones & Cambridge, 2010). Inequality is said to be greater in the urban than rural areas. Economic growth is associated with urbanization and declines in the urban and rural poverty. Inequality is also seen in insecurity. Insecurity is related to vulnerability—the sensitivity of well-being to a changing environment and household's ability to respond to negative changes.

Government being a vital economic agent has done little in bringing positive economic change in Nigeria. This can be deduced by examining the situation in Nigeria. The economic performance of the nation has not been impressive for several decades meaning government interventions has not been able to cure the ills in the economy (Siyan, Adegoriola, & Adolphus, 2016). To portray this fact Gordon 2013 examines poverty situation in Nigeria and concluded that economic growth and Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) spending has not substantially reduced poverty over the period. The key problem in operationalizing poverty is therefore defining which capacities citizens have to be considered as poor. To clarify the nature of poverty it is helpful to consider what exactly constitutes the opposite of poverty, just as the idea of "wealth" intrinsically implied a normative ideal of "successful" ones. It is difficult to conceive poverty without defining its counterpart.

Scholars have also argued that richer countries and those with high growth rates have less record of corruption and better functioning governments (Kaufmann, 2003; Aidt, 2011). In the same vein some also opined that an increase in the level of corruption from relatively clean Singapore to relatively corrupt Mexico is the equivalent of an increase in tax rate. Countries with high levels of corruption have lower levels of human development. Highly corrupt countries tend to under-invest in human capital by spending less on education, over-investing in public infrastructure relative to private investment, and degrading environmental quality. Treisman (2007) arguing from the point of poverty asserted that poverty and corruption have causal arrows that run both ways, creating vicious or virtuous spirals. However, some countries have managed to have high levels of human development in spite of the high levels of corruption. This shows that the relationship is far from deterministic Ackerman (2014).

The state of the economy has forced people to sell physical assets, move into inferior accommodation, send children out to work, reduce the quality and quantity of food consumed, postpone medical treatment, and/or withdraw from reciprocity arrangements such as rotating saving and credit associations. However, the chronic poor are unable to take advantage of the opportunities offered in cities and become trapped in a vicious circle of poverty and deprivation (Rakodi, 1999). The poverty level in Nigeria is not only high but with many socio-economic challenges (Siyan, Adegoriola, & Adolphus, 2014).

National Threat

Corruption is said to be driven by the dynamics of a large set of formal and informal institutions in society. Also of consideration is that neither the formal nor the informal institutions are easily changed because they constitute self-reinforcing equilibrium (Rothstein, 2007). Corruption raises transaction costs and creates uncertainty and bottlenecks in the economic. Bribery, a common type of corruption, leads to inefficient economic outcomes. It distorts sectoral priorities and technology choices by for instance, creating incentives for large defence contracts instead of rural healthcare clinics. Corruption misallocates talent to rent seeking activities and impedes long term foreign and domestic investment.

Nigeria and the West African region in the course of the 20th century was said to have gone through a revolution consisting of an explosion in population, the rise of huge cities and the rapid integration of the region into the world economy. However despite these, the country is said to be experiencing a state of absolute poverty (Siyan, Adegoriola, & Adolphus, 2014). Nigeria is said to be bedeviled by systemic corruption is an informal institution In the case of Nigeria, lack of transparency and accountability in the management of resources in both public and private domains poses a threat to development, democracy and political stability. Toure (2012) highlighted that, the stark reality that corruption, wastage, and misappropriation of resources continue to play a significant role in undermining Nigeria's development objectives at both National and sub-national levels including the efforts to achieve the SDGs little wonder Nigeria has been ranked low on the United Nations Development Plan (UNDPs) Human Development Index (HDI).

Corruption Promotes Public Revenue Loss and National Capital Flight

The effects of corruption is said to have manifests in the lives of Nigerians in several ways thus: In their empty days, empty pockets, empty pots, empty stomach, reality of thirst, hunger and unemployment as a result the activities of these saddled with the responsibility of piloting the affairs of the ration (Osewe, 2012). Corruption, i.e. Kleptocracy is both a social practice and an ideology of the new ruling class (Akinyemi, 2010). The alarming discoveries made from the whistle blowers policy is a good point of departure.

The Finance Minister, Mrs. Kemi Adeosun, announced on behave of the federal government the approval of a whistle blowing policy to expose fraud and other related crimes in both the public and the private sectors in December 2016. Nigerians were encouraged to see the policy as timely while she urges Nigerian to report any form of violation, misconduct, or improper activity that impacts negatively on Nigerians.

The Federal government on the 24th of March 2017 disclosed that the total number of cases of fraud and illicit transactions by serving or former public officers currently investigating under its whistleblowing policy has risen to 2,251. This was confirmed in a detailed article published by Obinna Chima on Thisday exclusive story where he wrote that, more Nigerians, mostly bankers and account officers, have started to take advantage of the federal government's whistleblowing policy to report the wrongdoings of former and current public office holders suspected to have embezzled public funds and stashed them in several Nigerian banks. A breakdown of this, according to data made available by the Ministry of Finance showed that while 95 of such cases were reported using the whistleblowing website; 1,550 through a dedicated telephone line for the policy; 194 through e-mails sent by the whistleblowers; and 412 through text messages.

Furthermore, it put the number of tips received so far at 282. A breakdown of the manner in which the tips were received also showed that while 49 were through calls; 87 through SMS; 95 through the website that was developed for the initiative; and 51 through e-mails. In addition, the actionable tips received were put at 154.

According to the ministry, some of the tips include information about contract inflation and conversion of government assets to personal use; ghost workers; payment of unapproved funds; embezzlement of salaries of terminated personnel; improper reduction of financial penalties; and diversion of funds meant for distribution to a particular group of people (farmers).

Others include the diversion of funds to personal commercial bank accounts to earn interest; non-remittance of Pension & National Health Insurance Deductions (NHIS) deductions; failure to implement projects for which funds have been provided; embezzlement of funds received from donor agencies; embezzlement of funds meant for payment of personnel emoluments; violation of Treasury Single Account (TSA) regulations by keeping funds in commercial banks; violation of Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) Value Added Tax (VAT) regulation by adjusting VAT payment; and non-procurement of equipment required for aviation safety. Furthermore, the ministry of finance disclosed that other tips received were centered around money laundering and diversion of funds meant for approved projects; illegal sale of government assets; diversion of revenue mostly Internally Generated Revenue (IGR); financial misappropriations (embezzlement); concealed bailout funds; mismanagement of micro-finance banks; illegal recruitments; and violation of procurement Act.

THISDAY reported that some bankers were being encouraged largely by the reward of between 2.5 per cent (minimum) and five per cent (maximum) of the total amount recovered. It was gathered that several former and current public officers who had allegedly stolen from the treasury either hid the physical cash in safe houses or used shell companies, close aides, associates and family members to stash the ill-gotten funds in bank accounts. However, though the accounts are not in the names of the political office holders, they usually operate the accounts themselves, a fact that is well known by the bank account officers who help them manage the accounts.

As the federal government unveiled the whistleblowing policy as a means of recovering stolen public sector funds, a number of junior and middle-level bankers have been quietly exposing the true beneficiaries of the accounts in order to cash in on the rewards derivable from the policy. A better understanding of poverty, vulnerability, social exclusion and identification of constraints on the ability of individuals, households, and communities to access key assets and services provide pointers to appreciate policy interventions (Devas et al., 2004, cited in Rakodi, 2014).

Policy Recommendation

It is said that one major problem of statecraft and politics in Nigeria has been the inability to generate, package, and implement viable and effective public policy (Mato & Olasupo, 2014). Another class of scholars are of the opinion that clever technical solutions, based on economic incentives are not enough to curb corruption because powerful groups with huge source of patronage will search for another vulnerably sectors to devalue. This explains why effective and long-lasting corruption control is a rare and precious achievement but most likely not beyond the power of determined and intelligent political reformers. It is recommended that, government should put structures in place that will make it difficult for officials to be involve in corruption of any form, one easy way to do this, will be to confiscate defaulters properties.

Moral leadership from top down has generated into empty rhetoric or witch hunting against opponents. It was argued that policies that will address corruption must consider the underlying conditions that create corrupt incentives, or it will have no long-lasting effects. Corruption is a symptom that state/society relations

undermine the legitimacy of the state and lead to wasteful public policies (Glaeser & Saks, 2006). However, where the middle class is either weak or non-existent then the task of holding government to account becomes a herculean one. The most effective policies with direct or indirect impact are national economic and social policies. Their effects are mediated through markets and through the activities of governments which have varying capacity to adopt pro-poor policies, especially at the local level (Rokadi, 2014). In the same vein Asobie (2012) highlighted that addressing corruption without tackling the underlying system of exploitation and socio-economic inequality will be treating the symptom of a deadly disease rather than exploring its epidemiology for a more enduring remedy. In other to bridge this created socio-economic inequality and exploitation, recovered wealth should be pushed into projects/programs that will benefit the less privileged for instance scholarships for orphans.

Cross-country research suggests that the gains from reducing corruption and improving governance are large. The state must protect civil liberties and establish the rule of law—rules must be clear and fair and be administered competently and fairly. These must include an honest, professional, and independent judiciary, police, and prosecutor who have similar level of integrity and competence. At the end of the day, it will yield a substantial net benefit for targeted anti-corruption intervention (Olken & Pande 2012). The author makes bold to concur using the whistle blowers policy as one option that is already yielding clear benefits with minimal costs with not just a high rate of returns but also a promising future for the nation and her citizens. This is one policy that should not be dropped in a hurry but rather be improved upon by subsequent government.

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The Troyan Terrorism as an Established Order (*Disciplina*), or the Nomadic Colonatus(Mission of Mith in the space of Sir Thomas More's "Utopia")

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The Troyan horse served here as a sufficiently vivid picture to enter into the history conflicts of an archetypal symbol of treachery and robbery, a metaphor for domination, a monad of violence and its justification. The body of terrorism rests not on ideology/beliefs/religions—it is purely a practical idea, behind which there is only one thing: terra nova—the habitat. It is necessary to look for other reasons for the massacres and public executions of modern times, because no religion calls for open murder—only dogmatists armed with faith, craved crusaders hikes, and therefore cannot be recognized and accepted as responsible for the murder. This is the search for the guilty, but only the person is guilty—the fault is his area of responsibility. The Utopians of Thomas More, who revered Mithra, acted like him: like Greek gods, they interfered in human wars, descending from heaven, and restored justice by waging war beyond their state borders, as if protecting the inviolability of their territory and their laws, whose rejection, like, and encroachment on them, led to armed conflicts, the purpose of allowing them was the introduction of forced disciplina (established order), sanctioned by Mithra himself. It is this identity that allows us to consider Utopia as an extended invective for the entire social order, regardless of time and place, and in particular the state as a paramilitary mechanism for the improvement of the human hostel, based on regulations that allow and, more often, provoke its violation, since destabilization is the driving force of existence. This polar involvement of Mithra in the war lies hidden in the very aporia of the world-war, which turns the god of treaties into the chthonic deity of destruction and murder.

Keywords: Troy, terra, colonatus*,* nomadic piracy, disciplina,Thomas More, Mithra, state

Introduction

Let us return to the thread of the story of the "Trojan Terrorism", outstretched from Moscow to London at last year's October conference, interrupted somewhat because of its twist, but only because of its length, suggesting the thesis: Orientalism as a political strategy arose long before its classical paradigm, scientifically justifying the craving for missionary work and colonization, covering the thirst for power and money-grubbing with love for art and humanism. Thucydides, completing his story of the permanent migrations of the Hellenes by passage about Trojan War as a starting point of these movements, makes it clear that the military campaign under Troy was the first militarized journey that accustomed the ancient Greeks, absorbing new spaces,

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mastering and remaking them to their own needs. The double ax of Troy is the most common weapon in the Mediterranean region of the 1st millennium B.C. (His image was retained by a red-figured vase kept in the British Museum), like the final explosion—a horse stuffed with a rearguard, thrown by the Achaeans near the Asia Minor coasts, legalized the militant art as a mode of existence, retaining for war, in view of its duality, or "double bottom", the right to contradiction. Trojan horse served by a bright enough picture to enter the history of the conflicts of archetypal symbol of cunning and robbery, significant metaphor of dominance, the Monad of violence and its justification.

Let us turn to the statement of the problem—the self-presentation of terror. Note that the body of terrorism rests not on ideology/beliefs/religions—it is exclusively a practical idea, behind which there is only one thing: terra nova—the habitat. To give a shade of orientalism to the course of thought, let us introduce by melted milk the historical context from my works "The Receptive Curse of Utopia" and "The Journey as a Gene of European Culture" written more than 10 years ago, one published and the other just to be printed (Menshikova, 2012; 2016; 2018a).

The reconstruction of the battering implement of the ancient Greeks allows not only to judge about the technical characteristics of the army and combat equipment ("polyoryka"—the ancient martial art of the siege of the cities, which is described sufficiently and detailed by Apollodorus, Athenaeus, Vegetius[1]), but also to admit that the Trojan horse was a forerunner of such weapons, without which then no one siege of the city no maked a shift, and the siege "machines" resembled a horse in its outline.Filled with a brave rearguard and special forces of thugs, a wooden horse on wheels was rolled into Troy and exploded by the first prehistoric bomb, sweeping the city and the kingdom of Danae into flinders, "alive" trotyl: Odysseus's "fur-seals" pricked, cut, and tore methodically and noiselessly all living things on his way, ignoring the borders and the facet of permitted, clearing out Ilium from his citizens, as if it were their territory. De jure and de facto, this was the first act of terrorism, promulgated by the people's "mass media" on the entire planet, beginning with Homer, and replicated by art (all kinds), and as a "pirate method", borrowed from the world of flora and fauna, was adopted as a means of resolving conflicts, as a dominant force and superiority, by method of intimidation and blackmail. Sown panic and fear serve only one purpose—to occupy and expel from the territory. Tactical trick of the king of Ithaca was a desk reading in the "science of winning", without which neither Alexander nor Caesar and Trajan would have become successful and great generals. Now we justify their ability to ignore the boundaries of the Stranger, their ability to overcome the illicit, sometimes admiring their determination and stubbornness, with which they led their troops to their goal—alien space. But the rules are not set by usand history like evolution has been established and is being made by simple domination, by the right of the "first night", which could care less about borders.

In view of the brevity of the established format, leaving the fervor of reconstruction, we proceed to the preparation of our frog—the "nomadic colonatus", dismantling the metaphor for denotatum, and try to understand "wherewith is it breathe" and first turn on the light bulb to illuminate the entire procedure: in the preface of *Utopia* reminiscent reference to the bilingualism of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who enthusiastically pursues his understanding of "civil society" as "citizenship", soldered together by a single ethos that does not violate the boundaries of personal freedom and by international law that provides both freedom and duties before the society on the basis of property rights [Dionysius of Halicarnassus. 2005. II.6.1;16.1;8.2;7.2; 8.1; 8.3;

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[1] Greek polyortics. Vegetius. St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 1995.

9.1], allows to assume that the practicing lawyer Thomas More wrote in Latin, because the primary sources of his reflections—the books of Dionysius, Caesar, Cicero, Plato, Sallust—emerged from the cultural "non-existence" in Roman sandals, which was quite convenient at quoting author's sentences and own periphrases to the future governor of London, and therefore the Graeco-Roman bilingualism and dichotomy of the ancient political philosophy, allowing to synthesize ideas about the state and the civil community of philosophers and practitioners of the 1st millennium BC, provoke More to create a precedent—writing a political pamphlet, vested in hoops of comparative biographies, but under the umbrella of the Socratic dialogue about the contradictions in the English society of the Reformation period, presenting its "experience of adogmatic thinking" to the society.

The subsequent typological convergence of the More's "Utopia" with the Dionysius's "Roman antiquities" allowed me to conclude that there is a semantic and stylistic (up to direct borrowing of the official name—*the Greek* phylarch) coincidence in describing the structure of the state structure, from which it follows that the Utopians inherited the Greek vertical of power that does not exclude a national vote based on the exclusive knowledge of legislative acts by all citizens, and which has developed a system of laws directing State to "prudence and moderation", non-excluding "care about their own benefit", and the system of executive power, which operated strictly according to law, with rigorous observance of treaty obligations, which include the principle of trust as the fundamental in relations between citizens.At the same time, it is found that the Utopians were not deprived of private property, owned land allotmentand participated in the colonization of the surrounding lands through established commodity-money turnover and military intervention. The basis for asserting that Utopia is a non-existent society, or an imaginary country, is not.

Colonatus

And since More from the very beginning specifies that the Utopians "consider themselves more like holders than owners of these lands" (Th. More, 1998, p. 53), we dare to assert that in Utopia the colonial system was developed, a widespread form of using landed property since the time of the Roman Empire.

> The Colon was not just attached to the ground, it was attached to the land of the lord who was interested in being promptly and properly cultivated..., and therefore the lord, from whom the state demanded the receipt of taxes, had to make every effort to force juridically free "Give out" in full, not particularly considering with his free juridical status, with juridical guarantees of his rights. (Fichmann, 1991, pp. 27-45)

And "the meaning of the word 'colon' is that it denotes the social-professional attachment of the colon as a landowner" (Carrier, 1983, p. 219; p. 231; p. 226; p. 228). Based on the research of the famous papyrologer and connoisseur of late antiquity, Carrier(1983) and Fichmann (1991) specified that the colonatus was not a consequence of socio-economic processes, but was a consequence of the taxing reform of Diocletian, based on capitation, which could have been collected only if the taxpayer was attached to its *origo* (origin), that is, under the condition of so-called adscription ("interlineations", or "registry", or in a more modern version of "registration"). Such a socio-professional attachment to the land, as described by More, as it turned out, existed long before the writing of Utopia, and in fact the Utopians, being "the holders of the land", were hostages of the fiscal location.

Fichmann's conclusions, which convince us in the correctness of the typological convergence, observed in the texts of More and Dionysius, can be reduced to the following: the colonial relations were established as a result of an accord (agreement), herewith for the enforcing it, the law provided for a number of additional

conditions that took into consideration the interest of large landowners in a permanent and guaranteed labor force for the cultivation of land and which were aimed at attaching to the estate of the worker/tenant (Constitution, 244 AD. (Carrie, 1983, p. 212)), on the aspiration to keep the colonists and their offspring in the estate, supplementing the number of dependent colonists, disposing of on the basis of legal legislation by the offspring of the colonists from mixed marriages between free and colonists, and between the colonists of different lords, herewith the status of the colonists should have been documented, have a state qualification and not one lease agreement (contract as such), which was recorded as *colonus homologus*(415 AD), that is, the "colonus concerned with the contract". In fact, this is a contract service and we know that in the modern conditions of development of economic relations the "contract" as an "employment contract" is inclined to move: volatile and mobile—it transforms the colonus into a nomad.

Discovered by Fichmann, mutual benefit: both the colon (the holder) and the landowner—in preservation the colonial relations, guaranteeing the hereditary attachment of the colonists to the estate for the large landowner, and the colonists—the strength of holding, while the escape and harboring of the colonists severely punished, which was prescribed by the state in harsh terms, was reflected in the artistically constructed reality of the Utopian stated by T. More, where citizens were in certain economically-contractual relations with the employer, which provided observance a kind of archetypal, but normatively prescript, the LC—Labor Code (e.g., strict six-hour working day). However, the system of contractual relations, discovered in Utopia as a cast of Roman realities, is determined by the cult of Mithra, the god of agreement and consent. The cult of Mithra[2] was widely spread outside of Iran, especially in the Roman Empire, where it was revered on a par with Jupiter or identified with Zeus. One of Mithra's epithets is the "straightener of lines (borders)", which not only refers to the possible and reconciling role in disputes about boundaries, but directly points to the function of the priest-king, which existed from ancient times. The priest-king took part in ritual dimensions, which not only allowed checking the adherence to the *treaty*as a universal law, but distinguished between truth and falsehood in observance of the balance between good and evil, which in turn allows us to consider that Mithra is a deity, defining moral boundaries, that is, a deity, creating and protecting the ethos of the people as the treaty system.

According to Fichmann, between the juridically free colonus and the state stood a large landowner—the owner of the land (*dominus terrae*), to which the colonus and its *dominus* were attached, and this allowed the landowner (lawfully and illegally) to dispose of the fate of the colonus, and therefore the probability is high that the colonus turned into an employee, dependent on a large estate, into a person of a "worse" status, and that in itself, as a degree of "negativity" of the perception of a person and citizen, that is, a person of a "worse" status, recognized by the state itself, had been conscious of by the colonus, and could be changed into a "deterioration"by the lord, depending on the level of its political and economic power. This is an unwritten "slavery", but a fixation, an attachment to the land, and, at the same time, to its owner (something similar to serfdom of peasants in Russ), when the right and duty of the lord to sell it with the land, to dispose of the fate of whole family, did not allow considering the colonus as virtually free. This is the first contradiction: bondage indirectly—the passage of "Utopia" sent to it, when the way of movement of the Utopians makes a slip in

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[2] Mithra (av., "contract", "consent") is an ancient Iranian mythological character associated with the idea of a treaty, and also acting as the sun god. Mithra belongs to the Indo-Iranian pantheon: the name itself goes back to the Indo-European root, which is related to the designation of the idea of mediation, reciprocity, exchange (and measure), regularity, harmony, peace, friendship, sympathy ("Avesta", Parthian and Sogdian Manichaean texts, Zoroastrian calendar, Buddhist iconography, Greco-Bactrian coins of Demetrius, "The Rigveda", "Ramayana").

speaking, prescribing to citizens who are even in a short trip and allowed by the ruler himself, that is, in a temporary "detachment" from the land, register in the place stay and, according to the law about strict regulation of labor service, to work out the appointed time of his craft, otherwise they could not get a day's food (Th.More, 1998, p. 65). Let us note that in the state of Utopia there is a complex differentiation of labor: agriculture, animal husbandry, various handicrafts, construction (roads and town planning), weaving, trade, service personnel, education, etc., then we have an ordinary state with a complex infrastructure that works as well an established mechanism due to universal and compulsory labor without discounts on the social estate: All citizens and non-citizens perform labor and military service, and the existing fiscal supervisory authority keeps track of evasion of work and has a system of punishment of censure before departure to slavery (Th. More, 1998, p. 65). In short, the state as a state is no "Utopia", in terms of "illusion".

We read this Dionysius's passage:

> The crowd of the poor ... ... At first, they led a life full of hardships, in the mountains under the open sky. But when they decided that they had become sufficiently numerous and fit for battle, they captured a well-fortified city, from where they began to ravage the entire district with raids. Against them, the consuls pulled out the army and without much difficulty mastered the city. Having punished with the birch and put to death the instigators of the riot, they sold the rest as booty. It so happened, that together with the other prey the land was sold in the previous year, and the silver, obtained from the sale, was shared among the citizens. (Dionysius. 2005. XX. XVII. (20.9)

This is a picture of the colonists, who fortified one's position in the status of the "worst", preferring robbery rather than the treaty. I think for the reason that the owner of the land (*dominus terrae*), to which the colonus and its *dominus* was attached, exceeded its legitimacy, violating the agreement, exposing "personal interest", transforming them into a tumbleweed: mobile contractors—headhunters, who were always on the periphery of the policy in case of sudden "planned" overturns and revolutions. And this is an example of the failed "slave polis", when "peasant" ("rural", "uncultured, rude, but members of Athenian society, and therefore having rights to landed property"), declassed (without land ownership) and weary of idleness, for attempting to organize a "slave policy", is punished beyond measure, deprived of citizenship, grotesque hatch into understanding: Why does the revolution eat its leaders? So, in the mirror perspectives of the past, More sought truth, but opened contradictions (practically as in Kipling's tale about the baby elephant, but in contrast to More, no one beats us, only cheating).

The Utopians of More, who revere Mithra, acted like the Avestan deity: like Greek gods, they interfered in human wars, descending from heaven, and restored justice by waging war beyond their state borders, as if guarding the inviolability of their territory and their laws, rejection of which, as well as encroachment on them, led to armed conflicts, the goal of which was the introduction of forced *disciplina* (established order), sanctioned by Mithra himself. The divine appeal restored the borders that had been violated because of permissiveness or non-compulsiveness, which resulted from the ignoring of contracts, that is, disrespect to God, and imposed punishment in the form of fines and contributions on account costs and moral damage. Description of military demarches (Th. More, 1998, p. 93), but rather the clarification of More to the contractual obligations of the Utopians, which in fact are the winged determinants of all military campaigns, would be read as an artistic fiction and would be perceived as a stylistic figure, if it had no analogues in the past (the texts of Dionysius, Appian, Caesar) and the future (all subsequent historical chronicles, documentary evidence, memoirs of participants in wars, verbatim report of the Nuremberg trial, reportages of international conflicts in the Near East, Africa, Asia Minor, Europe, compromising evidence on state departments in Internet,

etc.). Exactly this identity allows us to consider *Utopia* as an expanded invective for the entire social order, regardless of time and place, and, in particular, for the state as a paramilitary mechanism of the improvement of public services of the human hostel, based on regulations that allow and, more often, provoke its violation, since destabilization is the driving force of existence. This polar complicity of Mithra in the war lurks in the very aporia of the world-war, which transforms the god of treaties into the chthonic deity of destruction and murder. Here is the second contradiction and the incised "half" of our frog.

Nomadic Piracy

Mitosis's division into nomads and settled was the first in a series of class, ethnic, social, caste, corporate, and other divisions that will fall to one's lot of humanity in its civilizational development. Some have flourished systemic chaos and others have a clear organization of life, which assumed a strict hierarchy of the hostel/clan. While the settled demonstrated their unavailability to properly organize their lives in a new place—an overgrown household would require developed means of transportation, nomads, on the contrary, easily removed from their seats, owning small ones, moving in small groups that provided mobility and maneuverability. Moreover, it should be noted that at the heart of piracy, which subsequently spread on the planet as a virus, lay the same spontaneity and chaotic movement of a group of people, not burdened with family ties.

So, the nomad adapts to the situation and the settled adapts the circumstances to himself, while the latter shows no less ingenuity than the first, and, since settled life demanded improvements not only in the arrangement of mode of life, but in entertainment and observance of order, then it gradually developed farming culture and irrigation, rock-painting, and epic legends as moderators of the traditions and education of youth. For the nomad, the danger was hidden by the unknown territory, which was still unknown to them, and a delayed-action mine waits for settled. This mine, buried in its own yard—security and stability of life, did not insure against civil strife between family members. The growing wealth of one of the settled people, who got the best land and who was more skillful in cultivating the soil, demanded his status quo—assertions in the rights with the subsequent right of continuity. So surpluses there were, than more insistently the power manifested itself: setting its own vertical and straightening the horizontal. Such obvious differences between settled and nomadic groups did not exclude their relationships. It was the nomads who acquaint the settled with the first skills of domesticating animals, as their own life proceeded in close contact with the living/wild nature. The further development of cattle breeding contributed to the emergence of commodity relations, at first, within the ethnos, creating the very precedent of dialogue in society. And if for the first it is important to dig a "treasure" out of the ground, and for the second—to bury a "treasure", the convergence of these vectors gave birth to Sophia, the very pre-philosophy that discovered the laws of nature to a man who, standing out for his equality in the sublunary world, discovered their responsibilities in biogenesis.

At the next stage of development, when the skill of movement was required, as wealth appealed to the expansion of its possessions to multiply and accrete with new sales markets, and the ripening demographic explosion forced to search lands for the colonies, the reaction of the settled towards the nomadic tribe takes place. A kind of exchange of technologies begins, as a result of which the settled began to apply the strategy and tactics of nomads—hunters and pirates, by and large, strengthening their money-grubbing way of life with a hierarchical structure and patronal way, mobile deterrence and suppression (armed detachments). The nomads, having adopted from the settled model of the social order—the family and strong tribal ties, accreting with

wealth so that their camps acquired the traits of a protopolis, that is, practically rooting, regenerated into the essence of a "settled", began to implant their cult, trampling on the boundaries of the *Other*. Thus, how settled, confessing the cult of wealth and power, and nomads, conducting the policy of anarchic brotherhood, were mutated. Nomadic way of life was dissolved under the wheel of a clear organization of the first civilizations: Sumerian, Egyptian, Assyrian, Cretan. However, it arose with greater force in one millennium AD among the peoples of the Mongoloid race, as if anticipating that this way of life can arise and arise from time to time, like a kind of vaccine that is hidden in the noosphere of mankind until a threat of assimilation to any ethnic group does not arise. Then frequent and regular movements in space (in search of pastures or better shares), creating inconveniences for entrenched societies and showing a different way of life, begin to threaten to others by assimilating. And although my explanations are of nature of a speculative warning, the second "half" is incised—let us descry it only at the gleam of the historical map.

Colonial Development of the World as Disciplina

If the existing piracy of archaic tribes can be considered as a consequence of the nomadic way of life, which was favored by a certain part of the pra-humanity, which fell under the charm of the "bourgeois" polish of the settled, then the campaign to Troy should be perceived as the satisfaction of the geopolitical ambitions of the nomads who are not accustomed to the monotonous work—the Asia Minor fertile land with developed irrigation system, inherited from the Sumerians, attracted the Achaeans and the inhabitants of Argos, who lived in more than modest natural conditions, and the Denyen, as a result of the Santorini eruption turned up a scanty territory with the destroyed infrastructure of the former Crito-Mycenaean civilization. The eruptions of the Santorini volcano (from 1620 BC and for three centuries after the first and most powerful one) prevented the population of Crete, the Cycladic group islands, and the closely connected southern part of the Peloponnese to rearrange farm, collapsing in an economically catastrophe, as a result, they were forced to seek new lands and resources to restore their former power and influence. The campaigns for the "golden fleece" of Asia Minor were undertaken more than once, as evidenced by the archaeological excavations of Schliemann, who discovered more than one Troy, and seven—the city was restored after each raid in its original place, blossomed, and even more attractedresolute and cunning sea robbers, who were greedy for profit, by its eastern flavor. Homer's phrase: "beware of Greeks bearinggifts" sounds not only as a warning of human perfidy, but as a characteristic of the ancient Greeks who are achieving their goal in anywise. According to Thucydides (1999), Hellas became Hellas only after the last joint campaign to Troy in 1320 BC, in which representatives of various tribes of Ancient Greece took part, pursuing their own mercenary goals: from solving the problem of overpopulation, from the depletion of natural resources to the accumulation of initial capital. That is, after realizing the common task and accomplishing some joint efforts, namely: a large-scale demarche of military forces involving all the available groups of troops and formations that were in the territory of the Aegean and Ionian basins, as Thucydides spoke out, as a result of "mutual contact with each other". The Trojan War became the Rubicon, after which a new Greek civilization began and the campaign itself became possible, as Thucydides asserted, only after the Greeks got settled with the sea.And this could only happen due to the influence of the Cretan culture, which was built on the sea priority (Thucydides, 1999, p. 34 (I, 4)) Direct evidence that King Minos was not afraid of pirates, but most likely subordinated them to himself, is the fact that the Cretan cities, as shown by modern excavations, did not have defensive structures from the sea. And perhaps also because the robbery was an "ancient way of life" of the continental and riparian population, and

Thucydides testified, "then the occupation was not considered shameful, rather, it brought even some glory", and noted that the custom of carrying weapons is the consequence of spread of piracy (Thucydides, 1999, p. 34 (I, 5)).

Undoubtedly, the robbery business was popular, because by virtue of free morals, the temperamental ancient Greeks did not impose a ban on the profession, but some kinds of social activities were still blamed, maybe not explicitly, but with a clause: What is not forbidden, it is possible. Morals in the riparian zone were rugged—robberies. As the historian writes, as a result of long-standing piracy, the cities began to be built far from the sea inside the mainland, but this did not have any effect for educational purposes—the inhabitants of cities continued to plunder each other, referring tocoastal and, especially, islanders—the Carians and Phoenicians (Thucydides, 1999, p. 36-38.). The location of the main cities of Hellas—Athens, Tiryns, Mycenae, Sparta, Corinth, and the contents of the tombs: the method of burial with an abundance of weapons, betraying the way of life of the deceased, confirm these conclusions.

Small and spontaneous campaigns were replaced by massive expeditions of ethnic groups, well-equipped[3] and with a considered legend of tactical seizure—the restoration of trampled honor, which corresponded even then to compensation for moral damage. So the myth (stealing the bride and transference it beyond the sea) was beginning to be used for political purposes, and religious views were freely corrected to pleasures of personal ambitions and geopolitical interests. Explaining the failures of the Hellenes under Troy, Thucydides justified them by the poverty of the attackers, which, in the light of our talk about travel, is close to the truth: The descendants of the Pelasgians, because of the economic crisis (ecological catastrophe and as a result of crop failure, overcrowding, lack of resources, decline of culture), really experienced material difficulties, otherwise they would not have decided to resort to frank expansion of Asia Minor territory, hoping for a correct profit, like pirates for luck (Thucydides, 1999,P. 34-35.(I, 11)). This explains the narrative minimum of military operations in the *Iliad* itself—apparently Homer disposed of scarce material because of his actual absence: The collisions were spontaneous, irregular as pirates, which allowed Thucydides to make the assumption that the Trojan War itself is insignificant, exaggerated poetic imagination. In the chapter "The Battle for the Wall", the might of the defensive structures of the Achaeans is celebrated, showing not only fortification savvy, reinforcing the foundation with frequent piles, erecting "the highest visors", and providing the gate with "double locks" (Homer, 1990, *Iliad*, XII, p. 255), but also a certain skill in landscaping his camp, for they had unlimited time. Apparently, the Denyen, persecuted by thirst for profit, had no desire to fight forever for the stolen foreign wife: Agamemnon, seeing that the defense of the camp is broken, offers to save the remnants of the army by fleeing to their homeland: "... There is nothing wrong in flying ruin even by night..." (*Iliad*, XIV, p. 75). What is more, the speech itself produced man in the commander, brought up by piracy, inclined to change course to save the looted more than to death on the battlefield. Carefully reading the *Iliad*, it becomes noticeably Homer's ignoring the actual armed encounters in pleasures for the lyrical digressions and mythological anecdotes.

The Hellenic Wars, being, in fact, trivial piracy, were the geopolitical reconnaissance with the subsequent possible colonization, and therefore they demanded a kind of heroic nimbus, transferring them to the status of sacred battles, the death of which approximates to immortality. The military expansion of the Hellenes ended in

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[3] "That all the oarsmen were at the same time and the soldiers, can be seen from the ships of Philoctetes: All their oarsmen, according to Homer, were shooters from bows. ... and their vessels were not decked out, but rather, in an ancient way, they were built like piratical ships" (Thucydides, 1, 10).

defeat—their return "on the shield" (to return defeated) of their greed lasted for years ("Odyssey"), and even this strategic error did not moderate their passion for changing places. Solon, one of the seven wiseacre, a poet, legislator of Athens, who traveled a lot since his youth as a merchant, explained the craving for travel by the "human desire for profit that has no limit" and the recklessness of youth, mourning: "... who is richer than others nowadays, striving to double. Who is able to saturate all the citizens?", and warning against moral errors: "The people's themselves prepare death, working hard for one money" (Golosovker, 2004), so the archon of Athens formed the world outlook of youth, future philosophers and historians, at a time, when "the war raged all around". The lyrics of the ancient Hellenes were, therefore, primarily heroic, that carried the experiences of desperate travelers, fearless warriors, expressed the hope of tireless romantics not only to find heaven on earth, but to make all the unspeakably rich, and therefore happy. That is why the poetic formula arises: "Money, money is a man" (Alcaeus of Mytilene). It was a great era of archaic entrepreneurship—"in it merchants were pirates, and pirates-merchants".[4] And since in the ancient Greek language the word "αθλοσ" had three meanings at the same time: struggle, labor, feat, such an active substitution in the lexicon says only one thing: *Military art was a way of existence*.

In describing the war, Homer does not even have a shadow of the elegiac of poets, who wrote with iambic: the eclectic vivid imagery, like Eisenstein's montage manner, with its swiftness and realism, force to turn away from the book as from the television broadcast of execution, the visible pictures of the greatest of poets are so expressive: "…even so furiously did Achilles rage, wielding his spear as though he were a god, and giving chase to those whom he would slay, till the dark earth ran with blood" (*Iliad*, XX, pp. 493-503), and Achilles's "invincible" hands (in the sense of "indestructible") draw an archival copy of the modern Robocop—so much he is "insatiable in war" (*Iliad*, V, p. 864): not only a shadow of divinity, under the mask of Ares, a mercenary, a fighter of foreign heads, a ferocious pirate, and therefore his army, like a flock of wolves, scouring in the field, hungry and irresistible ("Predatory beasts, in whom boundless insolence is in hearts" and because the poem can be considered both as an ideological order and as a moral teaching to posterity, which is obliged to build itself on the "fleet-footed Achilles" and "Ajax, bulging with anger". Apparently such greedy and impudent "black hunters" who lost their civil status and fell from a colonatus, scattered by a Tumbleweed, were enough in the Roman Empire—from them they collected cohorts of the "nomad colonatus"—a pirate who was on the rails of the colonist, along with the scalpel of the privative and terra nova). (And what kind of power was the educated "insurmountability", your own mind will tell you, need to see at the helmet, pierced in the battle at the Marathon, and found in the early 19th century—a hole from the shaft indicates that the spear has come in completely, breaking through the metal, frontal bone.)

And how do they fight at T. More? Tough and single-mindedly, like Caesar—affected the work with primary sources—"Commentaries on the Gallic War". So the regulation of economic wars under the oldest motto "The purpose justifies the means" formally legalized the beginning of military actions caused by non-compliance with the treaty, which implied a threat of possible ruin or violation of the boundaries of freedom, whether rights or property. Then Utopus announced a campaign for "compensation for damage", which the Utopians called "revenge for money insults" (Th. More, 1998, p.89), whose goal was to restore the "trampled" reputation of the state, in the absence of which "dishonor" should rather be composed in order to demand satisfaction, and, therefore, the consolidation and recognition of the other national credo of one Power

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[4] Golosovker, Y.E. Poets and lyrics of Hellas and Rome. Golosovker, Y.E. Decree. op. p. 36.

by the right of the strong. Allusions to today's military conflicts, in the center of which the USA appears to be "offended Utopus", are so obvious, and perhaps such "offenses" might look ridiculous due to the remoteness and geographical isolation of this state from most countries of the world, with which it is fighting and attacking, declaring, like Utopus, a long nose is hurt—"economic interest", that is, deprived of common borders with "offenders", and the Utopians, I recall, waged wars only in foreign territories—and never on its own, if not real victims and ruined states, and if in fact there were no historical precedents of such vilification—"insults" inflicted on the nation's honor and led to real cruel wars, migratory flows forming conglomerates of ethnic groups, literally, re-order the political world map (e.g., the stolen Spartan virgin as the redeeming victim of Greek colonization in Asia Minor in the 13th century BC, where the very moment of "theft" is rather controversial, since all the maidens of Sparta were trained in martial arts on a par with men, it was possible to "steal" only with the kind consent of the girl,and the Spartan queen, legally marrying a stranger of the same rank as herself, was not deprived of honor, and therefore revenge broke away by the earthen crock, especially since the marriage with Paris was not fictitious, but lasted more than 10 years; or the possession of the relics of the founder of one cult (Christ from Nazareth) by representatives of another (Islam) was declared an unlawful and illegal act that acted as the strongest aphrodisiac in the struggle for the spheres of influence of the Carolingian dynasty and the spread of Christian ideology during the Crusades of the 10th-13th centuries, then faith was used as a lever of control and mass impact).

Since it is precisely in finding a balance between order and disorder through the conflict, that humanity painfully seeks excuses for its existence, the strategy of war used at the present stage of human development shows only one thing: the cult of Mithra remains the only revered cult of modernity, as the rulers of countries continue to identify their actions with function of God—the establishment of a universal law, in which the war, its principles and methods, is inscribed in the judicial and juridical framework of the state structure, for being a stimulus of compliance with contractual obligations, transubstantiate in kimberlite ore of economic well-being. The main function of Mithra—the union of people in a special social structure and the establishment of contracts between them—explained the distribution of such categories as *mos maiorum*, *virtus*, *disciplina* (Makhlayuk, 2010), which existed on the position of three whales—the very basis of the Roman state, whose social significance would not be wealthy without honoring the cult of Mithra, that is, without reliance on the *call of ancestors*, *military valor*, *the established order*. Since the time of Alexander the Great, after the Macedonian conquest of Iran and after the accession of the Ptolemaic dynasty, the Achaemenid cult of Serapis (emanation of Mithra), elevated to the royal cult—the cult of the "god of power", providing both mos maiarum, and virtus, and disciplina, determined a type of public system as an institutional model for all times and peoples. Trying on military habitus as mandatory armor-attribution of its far from peaceful existence, the More's Utopians, leading the brutal war-retaliation in adjacent territories, establishing strict discipline of work, and establishing fiscal supervision literally every citizen, we can say, "inherited" the unit of the ancient state, was tailored a "perfect example"—Utopia state, unattainable idealization of which was denied, because the reality, revealing examples of the "machinery of suppression" in the full specifics of the real historical time, permitted to recognize in it the prototype of the social order. The state as a machine of repression appears to be the only form of human community that has been used since ancient times, but is not exclusive, because the most important task of creating a "good" for the majority within the "state" remains impossible to this day. It follows from the foregoing that the Utopian state could not become a prototype of a perfect state, the ideal of which

was the basis of the Utopian theory, since the supreme deity of the country, preferring the spirit of military valor to all peaceful "spirits", encouraged the strategy of the warrior in resolving contractual obligations—the same "*nomadic colonatus*".

And now to the problems that lay by chord to our space of reasoning—one's/another's/alien—Is its share in the general crying for humanity so important? Is it dangerous? And if so, to whom? Or else, who cares about fears that are excited by this three-part incantation "your/alien/other", this tricolor of identification. Correspondence to whom and what? And in this regard, we recommend stopping all talk about tolerance—it does not exist, because it is defined as "toleration", that removes the issues of the "boundaries" of the Alien, dissolving and ignoring primarily the *modus vivendi* of the Other, that is, the existence of a neighbor that lives better. Therefore, Troy remains the only true and correct explanation of the nature of terrorism. If we stand for individuality, then why do we pretend, insisting on overcoming "alienation" and "otherness"? Why should we necessarily sway someone into "our" camp? This happens when the "stranger" is allowed in by opening the gates and welcoming his "happiness" as bread and salt, forgetting that even a tamed pelican will swallow other nestlings and believing that the proclaimed tolerance and individuality, underlying the social order, will serve a protective letter from every foreign rearguard.

The problem of terrorism lays not so much in the range of law, and not so much in the range of faith, but, I think, in what is called "legal conviction", when both "right" and "faith" appear in one bund, when one provides the safety of another, this is the moral right that was transmitted by the "law of ancestors" by faith in divine justice and by the rules of behavior—the moral law inside (the same Kantian principle). And this conviction necessarily consists of a sense of duty and responsibility to the Other, which, in turn, is impossible without respect for the Other. When a belief in a moral postulate (the call of ancestors) justifies for your "right" to your boundary of existence, then this "faith" obliges you not to violate the boundaries of the Alien, respecting it. The call of ancestors, military prowess and established order (mos maiarum, virtus, disciplina) served the guarantee of individual freedom from the time of the Assyrian kingdom, and they are the determinants of boundaries (all kinds) and are the guarantee of that "happiness" that everyone forms for himself independently. For everyone who is not afraid to be a stranger and keeps himself in his "otherness", without encroaching on the boundaries of the Other. Mithra, the god of boundaries, treaties, and wars, was known as the patron of the wise, and he ensured that people did not break contractual obligations. It can be said that now other gods are reigned by the Absolute, but man, not having lost the need and ability of "faith", without losing the passion for superstition, suddenly believed in his own impunity, having got used to the practice of indulgences, and is convinced of his right to violate any obligations.

Alien space is searched only when, for obvious and implicit reasons, it ceases to like its own—hitherto native, unique, and unrepeatable. But the reason can also be quite objective—war, natural cataclysm. Then all that is left of the "house" is collected in a bundle, in a pocket—and beyond the threshold (if it is still there), taking with it its "own" space, as it was with Aeneas, that after the defeat of Troy, the loss of parents, hearth, kingdom, capturing a bundle with the "ashes of Priam", based on the Apennines a new kingdown of Aeneids—the future Great Rome. Fear and panic help clean up the territory, sometimes instantly, it was they who contributed to the affirmation of the Achaean tribes, but I believe, that Aeneas himself also resorted to them, crowding the Etruscans, freeing up the space for fugitives from the ruined paradise of Troy, caring for the restoration of his "house" (clan-tribe) on a new, alien land.

The Ilion's bastions turned up a kind of martial arts school, after which its students, enriched by the experience of survival, opened the era of migration wars and, having entered into an internecine struggle for independence, developing piratical inclinations, doomed mankind to live by transition from war to revolution and back.The interaction of different peoples in the region of the coastal Asia Minor, beginning as a journey-invasion, was transformed into cultural interchange, but the war for the warring sides remained almost the only way of existence, as if the warring nations anticipated that further ethnic assimilation threatened the decline and extinction of ethnic groups, and therefore, created on its basis, the heroic and philosophical epic by Homer can be considered the first orientalist study, which, in turn, proved to be an invaluable source for a multidisciplinary discourse, a kind of poetic provocation that wove a system of representations about Antiquity as the cradle of civilizations. It can be concluded in this way that, from the earliest times, the "positive" evaluation of war as a useful practice, as a result of which the human character is tempered, and his consciousness is cruel, passing through the crucible of reassessment of former values, with strong support from philosophers (Heraclitus), only developed militaristic inclinations of mankind—the whole further history is a vivid confirmation of that: The war moved the world and the war is distant, suggesting a campaign, otherwise a journey, and the authorities thus sought and still found ways of its legitimacy—and in *virtus*and *disciplina*, that guarantee of divine predestination, and ensuring the legitimacy (system of contracts) and order (the state structure)—so the god of war (Mithra) continues to rule the state. Here is the third contradiction: Laws provoking wars—an baby elephant can get its proboscis -

> Так любопытствуя от лени,
> Мы созерцаем глубину,
> что оседает в чаши пенной,
> суть растворяя не внимая:
> осадок тянет на елей,
> что достается опоздавшим
> к столу героев и богов,
> амброзию с ленцой вкушавших, -
> так изменяя смыслу капиллярно,
> вместо чистоты рассвета
> нам достается только манна…

Learning to see the boundary of the Other is the vital necessity of the day to preserve the "person" in Man, to keep the Consciousness in health, to stop "escaping" into an identity that, as it turned out, is a wandering, timeless, between three pines (in three dimensions), in fact, from Deed/Action, from responsibility, vegetation in the immaturity and empty, but ringing, aggression, so as not to slip, like jellyfish, into slavery of material, which picked up the heads of the "spirit-poor" of consumption society, which becomes scanty of its own stupidity. It is necessary to return to the old "canons and laws"—the boundaries of existence, which are the norms of life reference points.

Modern lexical interpretations strongly link the meaning of the word "terrorism" to the word "terror" (fear), which someone once found in Aristotle's texts—there are no precise instructions, besides, Stagirus himself passed the real horror of "second birth", having passed captivity of strangers interpretations and dozens and hundreds of translations. And, as a rule, the true meaning of words is stored by a stable unit, fixed on the tail of winged expressions.The dictionary of Latin proverbs tells us: "*TERRA incognita*" is an unknown land, and "TIMOR *est emendator asperrimus*"—fear—is the most severe mentor (Kupriyanova & Umnova, 1996).As we

can see, the denoters are different—the word "fear" in Latin had completely different inscriptions. Is there another discrepancy or dexterous manipulation? And since, the habit of frightening and fearing is thriving, the fear is, indeed, the *emendator asperrimus*.

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