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### THE SORROWS OF EXTERNAL SECULAR EXPECTATION IN POST-ISIS ERA

With the demilitarization of ISIS (Daula Islamiya Iraq wa Sham - Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), the national question in the region began to develop rapidly in terms of post-conflict reconstruction. During the post-ISIS period, local forces, especially local ethnic independent forces, remained entrenched in the local religious community and religious culture. Nationalist forces that seek to mobilize the vast majority of the population for their own ends must be able to satisfy them with political materials that lead to harmony and cooperation, as long as the region's deep-rooted religious traditions serve that purpose. Although Western interference in this issue is also interested in establishing a regional secular order and secular succession regime, if nationalist religious extremism is limited to achieving the planned regional autonomy and independence of the outside world, tactically avoiding the skepticism of the outside world, then the expected political goal is planned. and then the repressed national religion is likely to retaliate in the future.

**Key words:** secularism, Post-ISIS Era, Middle East, kurds, national security, westernization.

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#### Пост-ДАИШ кезеңіндегі сыртқы секулярлы жағдайдың салдары

ДАИШ (Дәулә Исламия Ирак уа Шам – Ирак пен Шамдағы ислам мемлекеті) өзінің әрекет ету аймағындағы физикалық күшінің жойылуымен бұл аймақтағы ұлттық мәселе жанжалдан кейінгі қалыпқа келтіру тұрғысынан жедел түрде дами бастады. Пост-ДАИШ кезеңінде мұндағы мұрагерлік күштер, әсіресе, жергілікті этникалық тәуелсіз күштер жергілікті діни қоғам мен діни мәдениетпен тамырлас болып қала берді. Халықтың басым көп бөлігінің басын өз мақсатына қарай жұмылдыруға тырысатын ұлтшыл күштер келісім мен ынтымақтастыққа алып келетін саяси идеялармен қанағаттандыра алуы керек, бұлай айтудың негізі аймақтағы тамыры тереңде жатқан діни дәстүрлер осы мақсатқа дәл сәйкес келетінінде жатыр. Бұл мақалада аталмыш мәселеге Батыстың да араласуы аймақтық зайырлы тәртіп пен зайырлы мұрагерлік режимді орнатуға мүдделі болғанымен, егер мұндағы ұлтшылық діни сыртқы көріністі тек сыртқы әлемнің жоспарланған аймақтық автономиясы мен тәуелсіздігіне қол жеткізу, сыртқы әлемнің скептицизмінен тактикалық түрде аулақ болумен ғана шектесе, онда күтілген саяси мақсат жоспарлы түрде орындалмайды, содан кейін репрессияға ұшыраған ұлттық діннің болашақта кек алуына алып келуі әбден мүмкін.

**Түйін сөздер:** секулярлық, пост-ДАИШ кезеңі, Таяу шығыс, күрттер, ұлттық қауіпсіздік, батыстандыру.

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#### Последствия внешних секулярных ожиданий в эпоху пост-ИГИЛ

После уничтожения физической силы ИГИЛ (Исламское Государство Ирака и Леванта – Исламское Государство Ирака и Сирии) в районе его операций национальный вопрос в регионе начал быстро развиваться с точки зрения постконфликтного восстановления. В период пост-ИГИЛ партизанские отряды или, скорее, местные этнические независимые силы оставались укорененными в местной религиозной общине и религиозной культуре. Националистические силы, которые стремятся мобилизовать подавляющее большинство населения для достижения своих целей, должны быть в состоянии удовлетворить их политическими идеями, ведущими к гармонии и сотрудничеству. Причина этого в том, что этой цели соответствуют глубоко укоренившиеся религиозные традиции данного региона. В этой статье утверждается, что,

хотя Запад также заинтересован в установлении регионального светского порядка и светского режима преемственности, если национализм здесь ограничивает свой религиозный облик запланированной региональной автономией и независимостью от внешнего мира, тактически избегая скептицизм внешнего мира, то ожидаемая политическая цель не достигается запланированным образом, и тогда возможно, что репрессированная национальная религия может нанести ответный удар в будущем.

**Ключевая слова:** секуляризм, эпоха пост-ИГИЛ, Средняя Азия, курды, национальная безопасность, вестернизация.

## Introduction

The “Caliphate state” and ISIS’s control over the territory has collapsed, but in the post-ISIS period, the future political situation is still full of violent variables. At present, all the parties only have a general consensus on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and the subject of anti-terrorism, but they do not have effective and peaceful consultations on the ruling power’s affiliation. Even in the areas of banning chemical weapons and counter-terrorism, the parties have divergent views on specific implementation details, and even no hesitate to use forces. The prospective allies who have united under the banner of counter-terrorism to focus on fighting against ISIS have once again fallen into a new round of struggle for the support of new regional agents in the process of rebuilding post-war order. To some extents, in order to clearly distinguish ISIS’s religious extremism and to avoid the notoriety of religious negative factors, nationalism chose to participate in the follow-up political process by reducing religious strategies

### 1. Post-war Reconstruction and the Strategy of Decreasing the Religious Nationalism’s Influence

Extremist Islam is an explicit label of ISIS. Later independents need to deliberately de-extradite, and over-correct the group religious symbols slowly. However, religious nationalism also has some manifestations of extremist violence when it fights against ISIS. Kurdish community composition is complex, and it also includes certain jihadists. Behind the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran is a strong backlash from a deeply religious society against the completely westernized Pahlavi family’s abandonment of Islamic values. The Islamic revolution in Iran has inspired some nationalists who are glad to see a religious nation, and the latter has sought to replicate Iran’s experience in establishing a theocratic politics to build another Islamic state. One such group is the radical Kurdish jihadists in Iraq. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by mainstream Kurdish nationalist Jalal Talabani, followed the U.S. Special Forces to clear up Kurdish jihadists.

Earlier than ISIS, Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish Islamist group, also tried to form an Islamic state in Iraq (Devlin-Foltz and Ozkececi-Taner, 2010: 102). During the peak period of ISIS, Kurdish activists had a record of joining ISIS. At that time, these religious monks launched a number of terrorist attacks in Iraq and Syria’s Kurdish region for young Kurdish jihadists. “Islamic supporters” became one of the rebels in the Syrian civil war. In the strict sense, it is a terrorist organization composed of Kurdish jihadists.

The external world of Middle East, especially the Western world, is unavoidably ambiguous about Kurdish nationalism. Facing the demands of rejuvenation and establishment of the state, the response of regional and external powers is limited, focusing on diluting the religious color of the split forces, supporting autonomy first, but maintaining a conservative attitude toward independence. From the historical perspective of the Western response to religious nationalism, on the one hand, humanitarian intervention has been closely related to the protection of Christians, and almost all military intervention before the 20th century has been under this principle (Finnemore, 2004: 58-60). On the other hand, in view of the fact that the modern Western secular countries were established by struggling under the authority of religious forces, religious Western societies have always been naturally cautious about religious nationalism since the establishment of the Westphalian System. Because theoretically deduced that if a well-functioning nation-state could be established by the nationalism which is centered by religion, it could be interrupted as the entire Westphalian System that gives the nation-state legitimacy by secular ideology is delusive (Juergensmeyer, 2008: 10). It should be said that in the post-ISIS period, it is a wise political choice to initially take de-religion self-determination especially under the circumstance of both domestic ethical discrimination and foreign terror of Islam.

### 2. The Possibility of Post-War Radicalization of Religious Nationalism

Some author of *Huffington Post* prefers to view the Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq as

a paradise-like political ideal under the shadow of military Islam. Their common description is that the Iraqi Kurds has created a “peaceful, democratic, and relative prosperous” region in the turbulent Middle East and North Africa, and is an example that should be imitated. The international community is called upon to train and help Kurds as a model for regional stability (Norell, 2014). However, in the post-ISIS era, for Kurds, it is obviously not a political goal to merely show a sample of regional governance to a stable society to the outside world, but to gain a dominant political position, even to gain exclusive domination and achieve independent statehood. In order to win independent political capital and gain more external support, nationalists are eager to get rid of the stereotypes of Orientalism in the Western world and work hard to avoid their potential negative impressions of Islam at the expense of their religious identity. Is it possible that religious nationalism’s strategy of diluting religiousness will be radicalized after the war? To answer this question, we need to discuss from the two aspects as the order of religious nationalism’s political goals and the degree of their realization.

Mark Juergensmeyer’s *the New Cold War?* answered the question of why religious nationalism could rise after the Cold War. Western liberalism failed to fulfill a series of commitments such as economic freedom, and gave religious nationalism room and opportunity to rise after the Cold War. Religious nationalists are caught in a series of difficult contradictions (Juergensmeyer, 1993: 35). Religious nationalism strives to weaken the external expression of its own religion, cover up the belief factors that may be interpreted by non-religious cultural circles, abandons the religious and cultural identity of the original political community, and wishes to obtain the political identity of key countries and organizations outside the region to infinitely close to the goal of establishing independent nations. However, the region’s overwhelming threshold of religious culture has determined that religious nationalism has to abide by the same religion’s ethics and norms when dealing with neighboring countries, so as to avoid being threatened by direct attacks or interference from the surrounding areas. For example, the Kurdish nationalists in Turkey have publicly argued that the Islamic church “degenerates” the Kurds and they believe that religion will erode the social support base of Kurdish nationalism. But the real worries that Kurdish nationalists are facing actually come from the fact that the influence of the Islamic lifestyle has continued to spread in Kurdish life circles, and Islamist parties have risen and

become more active (Ekmekci, 2011: 1615). To win the possibly greatest vacuum race for power, religion has been a secondary identity tag for nationalism.

A simple nation-state is dangerous as the core reasons are: First, the achievements of nationalism at the expense of religious expression can hardly fully meet the political expectations of independence or toward independence. If the goal of nation-building is not achieved, or “peace, democracy, and prosperity” is far from being achieved after independence, then people’s disappointment is a kind of political psychology that can easily lead to extremes. The image of the Kurdish community is complex (Tekdemir, 2018: 7). The group strategy of Kurdish groups with an Islamic background is diverse, from caring for religious life, to actively participating in shaping a mature civil society, to launching a resistance movement, and to the extremist as using military force to achieve group goals; everything from birth to accession is covered. Extremes and violence are not insulated from Kurdish groups.

Second, as summarized by the author of *The Dark Side of Democracy*, the concept of “people” consistent with national morals in modern times has not distinguished ordinary people from ethnic groups (Mann, 2005: 55). The privileges of “citizens” may include discrimination and against other ethnic groups, its extreme is ethnic cleansing. Those who remain and are affected by ISIS, as well as those who bear the name ISIS, are likely to be the targets of revenge by emerging nation states. Just like Kurdish fighters have slaughtered ISIS prisoners of war in the fight against ISIS. Bloody revenge is another extreme.

Scholars who analyze Islamophobia in the Christian world believe that when the Caliphate State had the self-confidence brought by prosperity and power, the Islamic community dominated the cultural initiative and they completely ignored the West. Until the arrival of the colonial era, it all ended. However, when the westernization did not bring about the expected development, the Islamic world began to rethink the western order and institutions, as resentment, disgust and resistance arose. These reactions in the Islamic world are reflected in the Western world, and Islamic phobia has developed. The two sides cannot sever the retaliatory spiral negativism, and a new generation of Islamist is becoming more radical. (Ameer, 2016: 1-2).

This logic is not difficult to understand. In the United States and Europe, with the development of reform, there used to show the decline of patriotism, or being anxious of challenges that are judged to be immoral by existing values, as the movement which

is combined with extreme right-wing, religion and populism is called “rebound politics” (Lipset, 1985: 284). As al-Qaida and ISIS, those Muslims massacred Muslims have undermined the appeal of jihad to some Arabs, but it has not damaged the appeal of fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is inherently similar to post-Cold War nationalism, especially when a certain ethnic group is based on a particular religious’ belief.

### 3. The Struggle for National Independence: Going to War Again?

Since the Islamic Renaissance in the late last century, modernists in the Islamic world have opposed the simple equating of modernity with westernization, and acknowledged that Islamic tradition and western modernity can be effectively combined (Bull, 1984: 217). Rebellion against Western intervention is not the same as conservatism against modernity, but it means that religion’s resistance to a large extent is a “multiple interpretation of modernity” (Esposito and Voll, 2003: 238-239) by religious civilizations that do not yet have the dominant discourse power of the international system.

ISIS adopted an extremist strategy during its rule, while the later revitalized nationalist independent forces adopted a strategy to weaken the external expression of religion and give the outside world an impression of being far away from extremism. But if the de-religious post-war national independence movement does not conform to the objective development state of group religion, the suppressed religious environment may also be dangerous to the future political environment. The return of war and vengeful religious revival are two of the most typical evil consequences.

First, the struggle for national independence is the politics of recognition. The politics of recognition is a politics that shifts from honor to dignity and then to universalism. But the politics of difference would be chosen as the second way if the wishes of being recognized are impossible. (Taylor, 1994: 32-37). In the current post-ISIS period, the efforts to advance the independence movement in the chaos to gain international recognition tend to fail, and then the independence movement is likely to turn to the politics of difference, and even to the military revenge. The emergence of Palestinian Hamas in the late last century is a typical example. Islamic resistance groups like Hamas are “nationalist Islamism” (Paz, 2011: 203).

According to *The Remnants of War*, wars may not be necessary for future politics, but from

small-scale crimes to regular wars, conflicts have multiple manifestations. Rebellions, guerrilla wars, and people’s wars can all break out during the transitional region from terrorism to regional wars (Mueller, 2004: 15). During the reconstruction of the post-war order, nationalist forces with the capable of military, and could not be controlled by the government brought security threats to regional peace. In a mature military-political model, the greater the right of speech the professional military officer group has, the greater power of realism, and the less the possibility of conflict (Huntington, 1957: 409). Military forces could be divided into two categories: disciplinary forces and miscellaneous forces. Because of participating in the war against the autocracy and ISIS, the degree of militarization of the Kurdish National Independent Armed Forces has been greatly enhanced no matter the capabilities of weaponry, technical level, or information. However, the army and fighters under the control of the nationalist independence movement do not meet or do not belong to a mature military-political model, as their professionalism is still limited.

Some western scholars are wary of the fundamentalization and militarization of Islam. Islamic Fundamentalism (Chinese scholars generally emphasize that the Islamic countries represented by the Middle East must not be distorted and degraded, and attach importance to the integration and participation of the Islamic civilization system in the international system with an inclusive attitude) refers to the Salafism of religious retro-ism. Salafism, which pursues religious orthodoxy, can be further divided into Jihad Salafism and non-Jihad Salafism. The difference is mainly reflected in the methodology of realization. Extremism and militarized Islamism have coverage and relevance. Islam is peaceful, and Islam is a set of value systems that guides survival, life, and livelihood. But researchers also warn that religion is dangerous if there is no specific doctrine of conflict and restraint (Sen, 2006: 70). According to the author of *Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Ideology and the Challenge to America*, militant Islam emerges if the peaceful means could not satisfy the political needs of those Islamists (Aboul-Enein, 2010: 90). The point which favors the war would unite groups for a long time, just like a “blood sacrifice” (Marvin and Ingle, 1999: 1-5). Then, if nationalism with military armed forces turns to Islamism, and its political system does not conform to a mature military and political model that can suppress war, the threat of war recurrence exists.

Second, the possibility of violent competition among sects within independent forces due to competition has not been eliminated. The differences between the different sects of Islam cover almost every aspect, from the abstract view of life and death, war, civilization, to the religious status of current politics, national self-determination, sovereignty, international law, attitudes towards the United Nations, and even the status of women in specific life, sexual freedom and others may all have conflicting positions and views (Phares, 2007: 39). In addition, the ambition of religion to advance into the political community is difficult to avoid. For example, Muhammad Badie, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, made the following statement in 2011: Muslims should fight for “a government that can develop into a caliphate and eventually seize the world’s dominance” (May, 2012). However, the “struggle” to achieve mergers may lead to conflict. Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s ongoing spread of Wahhabis to Sunni countries was viewed by opponents as a new Islam colony founded by worldwide money and indoctrination, while Sufis or Malikis are marginalized (Aboul-Enein, 2010: 209). In addition, with the promotion of some Wahhabis, anti-Semitism has become a basic part of modern Islamic fundamentalism, and has become a part of religious loyalty.

In terms of attitudes towards violence, if it is said that committed to revolutionary and overthrowing social movements could be divided into two branches of radicals and moderates in the pursuit of political goals, then activism in the Islamist movement could be divided into radical jihadists and moderate Islam. Some authors believe that compared to jihadists like Al Qaeda, nationalist Islam (represented by the Brotherhood of Muslims) and non-Jihadist fundamentalism could not be considered as the radicals, but closer to the moderates (Armborst, 2014: 254-255). Because the latter two both admit political interference, not admit the use of terrorist violence to achieve their goals. But both nationalist Islamists and jihadists tried to break the old order, and in fact they did not abandon the use of violence, including the use of political violence. The difference between the two is whether the goal of the struggle is to seize power to achieve political change, or to completely destroy the political system and create a theocratic government.

It is likely that Kurdish nationalists in the future will also turn to militant mass movements, just as they did in Palestine. In Gaza, until 2017, the dominant Islamist Hamas was constantly facing internal challenges from other old and new

Islamists, competing for political space and power. This kind of competition is not only a ruling power competition among Islamists, but also a competition for the legitimacy of religious ideology. Those Hamas opponents of Islamism Are Salafi jihadists and global jihadists who are less concerned about the use of violence than Hamas (Milton-Edwards, 2014: 268). Fatah, a secular national liberation organization, would even blame Hamas for failing to effectively prevent jihadists from penetrating Gaza.

#### 4. Religion Revenge: Is the National Consciousness Which Gives up the Faith Expression Safe?

There are several major similarities between nations and religion. From the origin, no matter it is a relatively newly formed nation or an ancient nation with a long history, the national ontology is often imagined as ancient (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001: 25). The origin of religion and the imagination of religion are even older. Nationalism can also be a quasi-religious phenomenon as an originally accidental’s historical political form is considered absolute (Smith, 1994: 1).

When nation and religion are put together in the national narrative system, if the concept of national narrative is interpreted as a whole, then as David D. Latin has tried to prove, social systems are not rigid and their subsystems can provide strong internal power and large changes in external pressures will exert pressure on the subsystems, and eventually pressure the entire social system. The static and harmonious equilibrium state of the social system requires each subsystem to coordinate and adjust its own focus of carrying values and preferences (Latin, 1986: 175). The religious system is such a subsystem. Religion is deeply rooted in the body and mind of believers and faith groups, and nations are the carriers.

In the structure of civil conflict, nationalism is also implicated in religious polarization, religious migration, religious public diplomacy, racial opposition, human rights status, international intervention, social welfare levels, public education, political culture, and other social systems which could influence the trend of political situation (Fox, 2004: 25-26). Many nationalists use religious beliefs as an effective, powerful, ever-lasting convergence and driving force. The explanation of the driving force behind radical Islam is because of brainwashing, poverty, or unemployment has repeatedly been proven empirically wrong, which understates and underestimates the religious motivations behind the conflict. Ignoring the endogenous power of religion

is a reflection of the rigidity of western-style political thinking. It is an excessive worship of the appeal and charisma of individualism, secularism, and liberalism. It cannot be explained in the former area with strong religious atmosphere controlled by ISIS.

Unlike domestic politics, which opposes any form of lies, actors in international politics are likely to release signals to let other countries believe they will act in a way which meets the interests of theirs (Jervis, 1970: 62). National self-determination and independent nation-building are always an international issue, and the behaviors of nationalists always contain a certain degree of lies. Since globalization, religious renaissance has been repeatedly mentioned. Revival is a historical transformation inspired by current needs, but it is also full of worries about the resurrection, reinterpretation and re-creation of history (Brint, 1991: 172). Talking about the field of faith, if it is not the depolarization of natural development, but the obliteration of the original endogenous religion in the group for the purpose of obtaining independent political resources, it will not prevent the regeneration and revival of extremism.

In the study of the Iraqi Arab Ba'athist regime, some scholars believe that secular nationalists are likely to lose victory in cooperation with religious trends (Baram, 2011: 8). The danger is that after overthrowing the previous political system and power rule, religious forces will take over power, and it is difficult to say that Kurdish nationalist movements scattered across countries can always avoid repeating the same mistakes.

### Conclusion

According to the United Nations, more than 5 million people have fled Syria since the civil war broke out in 2011. The main exile countries are Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. There are still more people in Syria who have fled from their original places of residence due to the civil war (1). As the situation of the war slowly became clear, the Syrian government formed a special committee to help refugees who returned voluntarily to their homes and back to the normal life track before the war. The Kurdish armed forces have become a pawn for the United States to maintain regional influence, containing Turkey and the Syrian government. Without the support of the United States, the Syrian Kurds will be unable to withstand the local political forces serving in the surrounding areas. Not only the Kurdish forces although the main forces of

ISIS were basically eliminated and the Syrian civil war came to an end, all political forces in Syria could no longer separate themselves from external intervention forces and exercise political power in Syria completely independent. The intervention of the West is basically with the expectation of democratizing the secular political order. However, the complexity lies in the fact that even though the external expression of religion has been suppressed internally and externally, the deep-rooted religious tradition still follows the national liberation fighters and plays an important role in resisting external interference (2).

It is generally believed that the Westphalian System is essentially an international structure of secular nation-states, and a structural arrangement that excludes religious influence by peace and consensus. (Zhang, 2016: 50) The idea of a world order dominated by nation-state actors has developed into the late twentieth century and has encountered the adverse effects of Islamic renaissance in Middle Eastern countries. Stakeholders discussing the Middle East in the post-ISIS period cannot avoid tensions between different Islamic sects. Some contemporary Middle Eastern scholars likened the 30-year war in Europe in the 17th century and today's situation in the Middle East. They believe that the two are very similar in terms of the expressions of sectarian conflict and representative war. (Daragahi, 2018) Then European politicians support a political solution of "Westphalian Peace" (Axworthy and Milton, 2016) to solve the Middle Eastern chaos as they firmly believe that the international order of nation-states that can achieve peace through the skillful negotiation, mediation, and game of political diplomatic elites can also work in the Middle East. However, even from the perspective of purely secularism, the national capabilities and the political reputation of the political elites in Middle Eastern countries are not conducive to the above order assumptions.

On the other hand, theoretically, in order to construct order, people need to maintain an orderly specific social relation, which relies on the concept of "identity" which has the unification system, that is, the recognition of "us". "Identity" is related to the "other" distinction in the sense of binary difference. Some constructivists believe that the concept of "Western" itself is a Christian concept based on confrontation and hostility to Islam. (Lebow, 2008: 122) Therefore, the Christian world's vigilance over Islamic civilization also runs through the logic of political settlement in the post-ISIS period. However, the specific intervention policies of different

European countries in the Middle East are not entirely continuations of western modern secularized culture, nor are they merely based on the diplomatic inertia of alliance solidarity. The specific intervention policy choices of European countries in the Middle East are not only related to the export of democratic values, but also need to refer to the historical relations between countries, and have to adjust according to changes in domestic political and security situations. The expectations of foreign countries for the post-war regional order in Syria reflect not only their long-term strategic thinking, but also the introspection of the consequences of previous interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.

France is the most active EU country in intervening in Syria's democratic transformation. Germany is not affected by colonial history in the Middle East, nor does it have clear geographic strategic interests, and it assumes more of a mediator and follower role in Middle East intervention policies. In the Libyan war, France and Britain surpassed the traditional methods of "economic integration" and "soft power" after the Cold War, and became active promoters of military intervention with a clear long-term political goal, namely, to democratize the entire Arab world and using violent intervention to destroy the Gadhafi regime. EU countries are more restrained in military intervention in Syria than in previous interventions in Libya. It also emphasizes that a humanitarian disaster is occurring in the

country being intervened, but European countries prioritize the use of political means in Syria to sanction, isolate and shake the Bashar regime, rather than direct military intervention, unless terrorist attacks directly target European cities, the publicly declared target of military intervention is ISIS.

Europe, especially Western Europe, is under pressure from cross-border population movements caused by political changes in West Asia and Africa. Middle Eastern refugees bring domestic security concerns to European countries. It cannot be said that it is entirely related to the Islam identity of refugees. However, it is undeniable that the religious conservative tendency shown by the influx of refugees, the high fertility communities living together, and the increasing number of young people without employment have impacted the traditional mainstream Christian society and culture in Europe and caused cultural anxiety among the original European residents. Citizens of EU member states have returned as expatriate soldiers after joining ISIS, bringing extremist ideological infiltration, the threat of potential terrorist attacks and social and religious security fears to European countries. The internal anxiety of the group is reflected in the orientation of foreign policy, which is to support and believe in the secularized government in the Middle East, promote the democratized secular political order, and be alert to the religious changes of the nationalist forces.

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